Kernan v. Cuero
583 U.S. 1
SCOTUS2017Background
- In 2005 California charged Michael Cuero with two felonies and a misdemeanor related to driving under the influence and firearm possession; his plea form acknowledged a maximum sentence of 14 years 4 months.
- Before sentencing, the prosecution discovered an additional prior conviction qualifying as a second "strike," which would increase the mandatory minimum to 25 years to life.
- The State moved to amend the complaint under Cal. Penal Code §969.5(a) to add the prior conviction; the trial court permitted the amendment and allowed Cuero to withdraw his original plea.
- Cuero pleaded guilty to the amended complaint and was sentenced to 25 years to life; state courts affirmed and denied relief on direct and habeas review.
- On federal habeas review the Ninth Circuit ordered "specific performance" of the original plea (i.e., enforcement of the 14-year-4-month term), finding the state court contravened clearly established Supreme Court law; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether that remedy was clearly required by federal law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cuero) | Defendant's Argument (Kernan/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state court must enforce the original plea term after the State amends a complaint to add prior convictions | The original plea form is an enforceable agreement; amendment and withdrawal deprived Cuero of the agreed 172-month sentence, so specific performance is required | No Supreme Court decision clearly requires specific performance; state court’s allowance to withdraw plea is an acceptable remedy | The Court held no Supreme Court precedent clearly requires specific performance; Ninth Circuit erred |
| Whether Santobello or other Supreme Court precedent mandates specific performance as a constitutional remedy for a breached plea agreement | Santobello and some concurrences endorse giving weight to the defendant’s remedial preference, supporting specific performance | Santobello expressly left remedy to state court discretion; subsequent cases make clear specific performance is not constitutionally compelled | The Court held Santobello does not clearly establish a right to specific performance |
| Whether circuit or state-court authority can constitute "clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA §2254(d)(1) | Ninth Circuit relied on its own precedent and state-law contract principles to require specific performance | Circuit and state decisions are not "clearly established Federal law" as determined by this Court | The Court reiterated that circuit/state authority and treatises do not qualify as binding clearly established Supreme Court law |
| Whether the case is moot because the Ninth Circuit’s mandate has already issued and Cuero was resentenced | Cuero argued the resentencing made the controversy moot | State argued an unresolved sentencing dispute remained and relief could affect unserved portion | The Court found the case not moot and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutorial breach of plea agreement requires remedial relief, but choice of remedy left to trial court discretion)
- Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (plea agreements may be treated as contractual in some respects)
- Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (discussing California's three-strikes sentencing)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference; "fairminded jurists could disagree" standard)
- Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) (Santobello did not hold that specific performance is constitutionally required; repleading is an acceptable remedy)
- Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312 (2015) (per curiam) (state-court decision cannot be "contrary to" this Court absent a clearly established holding)
- Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21 (2014) (per curiam) (circuit precedent does not constitute clearly established federal law under AEDPA)