Kenyatta Ferrell Jones v. Commonwealth of Virginia
0351161
| Va. Ct. App. | Feb 14, 2017Background
- On Nov. 20, 2014, Fernando Morales’s 1999 Nissan Sentra and keys were reported stolen; police issued a BOLO and searched a neighborhood known as a dumping ground for stolen cars.
- About two hours after the report, officers located the Sentra; Jones was driving, a passenger (Clemons) fled, an occupant jumped on the hood and left, and Jones attempted to flee and was apprehended.
- The car’s ignition showed no damage and the keys were not recovered; Jones admitted he briefly drove the car and had a valid license.
- Jones testified Clemons told him the car was a “fiend whip” (a temporarily rented/borrowed car) and asked Jones to drive because Clemons lacked a license; Jones said he only fled after Clemons grabbed the key and ran.
- The trial judge discredited Jones’s explanation, convicted him of receiving stolen property (Code § 18.2-108), and Jones appealed challenging sufficiency of the evidence of guilty knowledge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Jones) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved Jones knowingly received stolen property | Circumstantial proof (possession of recently stolen car in known dumping area, flight on police arrival, admission he knew Clemons didn’t own the car) supports guilty knowledge | Jones claimed he believed the car was borrowed/rented and that he lacked guilty intent; his testimony created a reasonable hypothesis of innocence | Court held a rational trier of fact could find guilty knowledge; conviction affirmed |
| Whether possession + flight alone suffices to prove dishonest intent | Possession of recently stolen property and efforts to evade arrest supply circumstantial proof of guilty knowledge | Jones relied on Reid (unpublished) and argued mere presence/flight insufficient and his intent could have been to return the car | Court distinguished Reid (Jones was driver/possessor), held possession + flight + other circumstances sufficed |
| Whether the trial court was required to accept Jones’s testimony as a reasonable hypothesis of innocence | Commonwealth argued the judge could reject Jones’s story given credibility issues and prior convictions for moral turpitude | Jones argued his testimony rebutted the inference of guilty knowledge and created reasonable doubt | Court affirmed that the factfinder may discredit testimony; rejecting Jones’s hypothesis was not plain error |
| Whether the Commonwealth had to disprove the possibility Jones intended to return the car | Commonwealth must exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence flowing from evidence; but the claimed intent to return was unsupported by Jones’s own testimony | Jones argued he might have intended to return the car even if he suspected it was stolen | Court found that theory was neither supported nor reasonable under the evidence and need not be credited |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review)
- Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692 (possession of recently stolen goods creates prima facie guilty knowledge)
- Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264 (guilty knowledge is essential element of receiving stolen property)
- Spitzer v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 7 (flight/evading arrest can show concealment with guilty knowledge)
- Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296 (view evidence in light most favorable to Commonwealth)