Kentner v. City of Sanibel
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8637
11th Cir.2014Background
- Sanibel enacted Ordinance 93-18 in 1993, banning new docks/accessory piers in a designated Bay Beach Zone to protect seagrasses.
- Plaintiffs are waterfront property owners who acquired their riparian properties after the ordinance and claim riparian "reasonable docking rights."
- Plaintiffs sued in state court alleging the ordinance "does not substantially advance any legitimate state interest," removed to federal court, and appealed dismissal of federal substantive due process claims.
- Plaintiffs argued the ordinance (1) makes no parcel-specific findings about seagrass, (2) ignores less-harmful dock technologies, (3) has arbitrary zone boundaries, (4) allows no variances, and (5) serves aesthetics/property-value protection.
- District Court dismissed substantive due process claims as riparian rights are state-created (not fundamental); plaintiffs appealed, invoking Lingle to recast the proper test.
- Eleventh Circuit treated the ordinance as a legislative act, applied rational-basis review, and affirmed dismissal because the complaint pleads plausible rational bases (seagrass protection and aesthetics).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Lingle create a new substantive-due-process "substantial advancement" test for property-based claims? | Lingle recognized the Agins/substantial-advancement inquiry as due-process in nature, so plaintiffs say that test applies to state-created property claims. | Lingle only rejected Agins as a takings test and did not establish a new substantive-due-process standard. | No — Lingle did not create a new property-based substantive-due-process test; Eleventh Circuit precedent controls. |
| Are riparian/docking rights fundamental constitutional rights? | Plaintiffs claim protection of docking rights against the ordinance. | Riparian rights are state-created property interests, not constitutional fundamental rights. | Riparian rights are state-law property interests, not fundamental rights under substantive due process. |
| Is the ordinance a "legislative act" (allowing substantive-due-process scrutiny despite state-created rights)? | Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance on its face, so it should be treated as legislative. | Sanibel's ordinance is a broad land-use regulation applying to a class of properties. | Yes — the ordinance is legislative in nature, so the legislative-act exception applies and rational-basis review governs. |
| Does the ordinance lack a rational basis (i.e., violate substantive due process)? | Plaintiffs allege the ordinance is arbitrary and fails to substantially advance legitimate interests. | Sanibel articulates rational bases: seagrass protection and aesthetic/land-use policy. | No — under deferential rational-basis review plaintiffs failed to show the ordinance is irrational; dismissal affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (rejecting Agins "substantially advances" test as a takings test and tracing that test to due-process origins)
- Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (articulated the "substantially advances" inquiry later rejected as a takings test)
- Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (due-process zoning precedent referenced in Agins/Lingle)
- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (land-use/zoning due-process precedent referenced in Agins/Lingle)
- Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property interests are created by state law, not the Constitution)
- Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizes substantive-due-process challenges to legislative acts affecting state-created property rights)
- McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (defining fundamental rights and legislative/executive act distinction)
- DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (legislative-act guidance; zoning-type decisions are legislative)
- Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 2013) (explains rational-basis review for non-fundamental substantive-due-process claims)