Kent v. City of Columbia Falls
379 Mont. 190
| Mont. | 2015Background
- In 2003–2007 Columbia Falls approved a 79‑lot PUD (Cedar Pointe Estates) that replaced required sidewalks with a paved bicycle and walking path system, subject to City approval of design and location and ongoing inspections.
- Developers, engineers, and the City exchanged plans and correspondence; the City inspected the trails during construction and required certain modifications, but informed the developer the walking path need not meet ADA grades.
- On June 2, 2008, Casey Kent fell on a 24% grade portion of the paved walking path, later dying from head injuries; his widow Sara Kent sued the City and others, settling with all defendants except the City.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the City applying the public duty doctrine, concluding the City owed no duty to Kent absent a special‑relationship exception; the court later refused reconsideration after this Court’s decision in Gatlin‑Johnson.
- The Montana Supreme Court reversed: it held the District Court erred in applying the public duty doctrine as a threshold bar because the City had statutory authority and active participation that could impose duties under generally applicable principles and voluntary‑assumption doctrines; the case was remanded for trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Kent) | Defendant's Argument (City) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the public duty doctrine barred tort claims against the City | City adopted ordinances and approved/monitored trail design, creating a non‑delegable statutory duty and/or voluntary undertaking to act with reasonable care | The City owed only a duty to the public at large; public duty doctrine prevents liability absent a special relationship | Reversed: court may not apply the doctrine as a threshold bar where the government’s duty arises from other generally applicable legal principles or a voluntary assumption of duty; remand for trial |
| Whether Gatlin‑Johnson required application of the public duty doctrine here | Gatlin‑Johnson clarifies doctrine does not displace other duties; therefore District Court should reassess statutory/voluntary duties instead of presuming doctrine applies | Gatlin‑Johnson does not change that land‑use approvals are governed by the public duty doctrine | Court: Gatlin‑Johnson supports plaintiff—courts must first ask whether a specific duty (e.g., statutory duty or voluntarily assumed duty) exists before invoking the public duty doctrine |
| Whether City’s active involvement in design/inspection created a special relationship or voluntary duty | City’s active role in routing, inspecting, and approving the trails functionally amounted to assuming responsibility and induced reliance; thus a duty of reasonable care could exist | City’s approval role is a land‑use/regulatory function protecting the public generally, not specific individuals; Prosser and public duty doctrine apply | Court: Evidence of active, design‑level participation and knowledge of dangerous grade could support liability under voluntary‑assumption and statutory‑duty theories; summary judgment improper |
| Whether premises‑liability or other generally applicable principles independently apply | Kent argued statutory and voluntary duties (not premises liability) could create liability; she did not rely on public duty exceptions alone | City argued lack of ownership/control negates premises liability and public duty doctrine governs | Court: Not deciding ultimate liability, but held that where generally applicable duties or voluntary undertakings exist, the public duty doctrine should not be invoked as an absolute bar; remand for trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Gatlin‑Johnson v. City of Miles City, 291 P.3d 1129 (Mont. 2012) (public duty doctrine does not displace other generally applicable duties; courts must first identify specific duties that could support tort liability)
- Prosser v. Kennedy Enter., Inc., 179 P.3d 1178 (Mont. 2008) (applies public duty doctrine to municipal land‑use decisions absent a special relationship)
- Nelson v. Driscoll, 983 P.2d 972 (Mont. 1999) (adopts public duty doctrine and delineates four special‑relationship exceptions)
- Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65 (R.I. 1991) (when government creates or knowingly maintains a perilous condition and chooses not to remedy it, public duty doctrine may not bar suit)
- Cope v. Utah Valley State Coll., 342 P.3d 243 (Utah 2014) (affirmative governmental acts that launch or create an instrumentality of harm can remove public‑duty immunity)