Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board of Education v. Whitaker
841 F.3d 730
7th Cir.2016Background
- Ash Whitaker, a transgender male high-school student, sued his school district alleging sex discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause because the school would not let him use the boys’ bathroom.
- Defendants moved to dismiss; the district court orally denied the motion and later entered a written order memorializing that denial and (improperly) certifying the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
- Defendants filed a petition in this Court seeking permission to appeal under § 1292(b).
- Whitaker moved the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to reconsider and vacate the interlocutory certification; the district court granted reconsideration, revoked its § 1292(b) certification, and explained it had erred by not soliciting argument before certifying.
- This Court held a briefing on jurisdiction; because the district court withdrew certification, the Court concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the § 1292(b) petition and denied the petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear a § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal after district court withdraws certification | Whitaker: district court’s withdrawal deprives the appellate court of § 1292(b) jurisdiction | Defendants: appellate court could still hear the petition despite withdrawal | Held: No jurisdiction once district court revoked certification; § 1292(b) jurisdiction depends on district court certification |
| Whether appellate court may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over a non-final order not certified under § 1292(b) | Whitaker: pendent jurisdiction inappropriate absent a properly appealable companion order | Defendants: Court can exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction linked to separate appeal of preliminary injunction under § 1292(a)(1) | Held: Pendent appellate jurisdiction cannot be invoked here because the petition is not taken from an appealable order; pendent jurisdiction should be sought in the appeal from the injunction order |
| Whether district court properly considered § 1292(b) certification factors before certifying | Whitaker: district court erred in failing to solicit argument and consider factors | Defendants: initial certification was acceptable without further briefing | Held: District court admitted error and properly reconsidered, identifying the § 1292(b) factors required |
| Whether resolving whether "sex" in Title IX includes gender identity would control the case and materially advance litigation | Whitaker: appellate resolution would not materially advance termination because alternative grounds remained | Defendants: resolution would control a key legal question and aid litigation | Held: District court reasonably concluded the question would control a claim but would not materially advance termination given other surviving pleadings |
Key Cases Cited
- Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674 (7th Cir.) (factors for § 1292(b) certification)
- In re Hamilton, 122 F.3d 13 (7th Cir.) (§ 1292(b) standards)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996) (appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(b) derives from district court certification)
- Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35 (1995) (jurisdictional principles for interlocutory appeals)
- Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (interlocutory appeal jurisdiction depends on certification)
- Weir v. Propst, 915 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.) (withdrawal of certification destroys appellate jurisdiction)
- In re Powerhouse Licensing, LLC, 441 F.3d 467 (6th Cir.) (authority on effect of vacated certification)
- City of L.A. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.) (vacation of certification defeats interlocutory appeal)
- Ne. Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc., 707 F.3d 883 (7th Cir.) (pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine)
- Montano v. City of Chicago, 375 F.3d 593 (7th Cir.) (limits on pendent appellate jurisdiction)
