Kenneth Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc.
975 F.3d 742
9th Cir.2020Background
- March 2015: Rawson was detained by county sheriffs after alarming statements at a bank and transported for a 72-hour mental-health evaluation under Washington’s ITA.
- A county DMHP initiated the 72-hour hold; Rawson was moved to Recovery Innovations, Inc. (RII), a private nonprofit that leases its Lakewood facility on the grounds of Western State Hospital.
- RII clinicians (Dr. Halarnakar, J. Clingenpeel, S. French) filed and obtained a 14‑day commitment and later petitioned for a 90‑day commitment; Rawson alleges forcible antipsychotic injections and false statements to the court.
- The Pierce County prosecutor actively coordinated with RII clinicians in preparing and litigating the extended commitment, influencing diagnosis and trial strategy.
- Rawson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment deprivations; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants finding no state action.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that (given the statutory scheme, prosecutor involvement, need for court authorization for continued detention/treatment, and RII’s use of state property) defendants acted under color of state law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RII and its staff acted under color of state law for §1983 liability | RII clinicians participated in a state-controlled commitment process that deprived Rawson of liberty and forced treatment — state action exists | RII made independent medical judgments; private medical care and regulation alone do not make state actors | Yes. Court held defendants acted under color of state law and reversed summary judgment |
| Public-function test (is involuntary commitment a traditionally/exclusively governmental function?) | Involuntary commitment is a state function historically and thus public-function supports state action | Commitment and treatment are medical functions often performed by private providers; not exclusively governmental here | Court declined to decide historical exclusivity; public-function not necessary given other factors supporting state action |
| Joint-action / close-nexus: effect of prosecutor involvement | Prosecutor’s extensive communications and statutory role made the State a joint participant in diagnosis, detention, and trial strategy | Prosecutor did not override clinicians’ independent medical judgment; interactions do not convert private providers into state actors | Communications and statutory role created a sufficiently close nexus; state participation supports finding of state action |
| State authorization/imprimatur, lease of public property, and statutory commands to involuntary treat | Continued detention and forcible treatment required court/state authorization; RII leased state hospital grounds and applied state protocols — indicating state action | Regulation, subsidies, or leasing alone are insufficient to make private actors state actors | These factors (statutory command, need for court approval, lease on state property, and state imprimatur) weigh in favor of state action |
Key Cases Cited
- West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (private physician treated prisoners under state authority — source of state-action principles for contracted medical care)
- Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2000) (private psychiatrist held to be state actor where state was deeply intertwined in detention process)
- Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (limits state-action where private medical judgments control absent state compulsion or approval)
- Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (extensive regulation alone does not necessarily create state action; look for close nexus or state imprimatur)
- Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (leasing public property and interdependence can produce state action)
- Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (state-action inquiry is factbound; no single decisive factor)
- Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (different tests for state action — public function, joint action, coercion, nexus — are tools for the inquiry)
- Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty requiring due process)