Kenneth R. Jackson v. State of Florida
213 So. 3d 754
| Fla. | 2017Background
- Defendant Kenneth R. Jackson was convicted of first‑degree murder, sexual battery with a deadly weapon, second‑degree arson, and grand theft of a motor vehicle; trial court sentenced him to death. The case is on direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.
- Victim Cue Thu Tran was found inside a burning van; autopsy showed multiple stab and incised wounds causing death prior to fire; semen in victim matched Jackson by DNA analysis. Witnesses and surveillance placed Jackson near the van/theft locations; Jackson made inculpatory statements to jailhouse acquaintances.
- Defense presented alternate‑perpetrator theory and contested DNA, juror selection, admission of post‑mortem photos, and mitigation evidence (including history of severe childhood trauma). Defense sought to admit qEEG evidence in mitigation; trial court excluded it at Frye hearing.
- Jury convicted on all counts and recommended death 11–1; trial judge independently found two aggravators (murder during sexual battery and HAC), afforded them great weight, rejected CCP, and imposed death.
- After briefing, U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida; Florida Supreme Court ordered supplemental briefing and reviewed whether Jackson’s death sentence complied with Hurst and related Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Issues
| Issue | Jackson’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of Fla. peremptory challenge statute (§913.08) — facial and as‑applied | §913.08 denies equal protection and cruel‑and‑unusual rights because peremptory challenges vary by charge; trial court abused discretion refusing extra strikes | No constitutional right to peremptory challenges; statute rationally related to legitimate interests; trial court did not abuse discretion on cause strikes | Rejected both facial and as‑applied challenges; no constitutional violation and no abuse of discretion in denying extra strikes |
| Motion for mistrial after witness inadvertently referenced Defendant being “released” | The stray reference to being released and witness emotion were prejudicial and entitled him to mistrial | Comment was vague, isolated, could mean hospital/military; not connected to central issues; no prejudice | Denied; trial court did not abuse discretion; remark was stray and not vitiating |
| Admission of gruesome post‑mortem photographs | Photographs were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial because victim was dead before fire | Photos were relevant to cause of death, defensive wounds, and HAC; aided medical examiner testimony | Admission not an abuse of discretion; photographs relevant and not unduly prejudicial |
| Hurst (Sixth Amendment) error in sentencing: jury unanimity and findings required | Jury must unanimously find existence of sufficient aggravators and that aggravation outweighs mitigation; nonunanimous 11–1 advisory vote violated Hurst, requiring new penalty phase (or life) | State argued jury need only find a single aggravator (felony murder/sexual battery) and that judicial findings cured any defect; alternatively error harmless | Court holds Hurst requires jury findings that sufficient aggravators exist and outweigh mitigation; Jackson’s sentence violated Sixth Amendment; Hurst error is subject to harmless‑error review but was not harmless here; remand for new penalty phase |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Sixth Amendment requires jury finding of any fact that increases maximum penalty)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (capital sentencing judge may not make aggravating‑fact findings that expose defendant to death)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (Florida’s sentencing scheme unconstitutional because judge, not jury, made critical sentencing findings)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court: jury must unanimously find each fact necessary to impose death; harmless‑error principles apply)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (distinguishing structural errors from those subject to harmless error review)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (most constitutional errors can be harmless; structural errors are rare)
- Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006) (Apprendi‑type sentencing errors can be subject to harmless error review)
- DiGuilio v. State, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986) (harmless‑error test in Florida: State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that error did not contribute to sentence)
