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31 F.4th 1315
11th Cir.
2022
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Background

  • Forsyth County amended its Unified Development Code in 2019–2020 to ban short‑term rentals of residentially zoned properties and to permit continuation of any "lawful but nonconforming use" in a grandfathering clause.
  • The amended UDC made violations punishable by fines and jail time; the ban became effective in 2020.
  • Plaintiffs (a homeowner who operated short‑term rentals and a homeowners association) sued under § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing their pre‑existing short‑term rental use was grandfathered.
  • The legal dispute turns on the pre‑amendment definition of “dwelling unit,” which allowed use involving owner occupancy or rental or lease "on a weekly, monthly or longer basis."
  • The district court ruled that rentals shorter than a week were not lawful under the prior UDC and therefore not grandfathered; the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the statutory‑interpretation issue de novo.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the pre‑amendment UDC permitted rentals shorter than one week (i.e., whether the durational phrase modifies "owner occupancy," "rental," and/or "lease") Plaintiffs: the text does not limit "rental" to weekly or longer, so short‑term rentals were lawful and thus grandfathered County: the durational phrase limits rental/lease so <weekly rentals were prohibited pre‑amendment and not grandfathered Durational phrase applies to "rental" and "lease" but not "owner occupancy;" short‑term (<weekly) rentals were prohibited pre‑amendment and remain prohibited — affirmed
Whether the prior UDC was void for vagueness because it did not explicitly ban rentals under a week Plaintiffs: the ordinance is ambiguous/unclear about the short‑term rental ban and therefore void for vagueness County: the plain text sets clear boundaries; interpretation resolves any ambiguity Court: plain text resolves the issue; the ordinance is not void for vagueness

Key Cases Cited

  • Young v. Grand Canyon Univ., Inc., 980 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2020) (start statutory‑interpretation analysis with the text)
  • Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (use ordinary public meaning when construing statutory text)
  • Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021) (canons are useful but not rigid rules of interpretation)
  • Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 (2016) (rule of the last antecedent explained)
  • Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (series‑qualifier canon and natural construction principle)
  • Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (presumption to give effect to every word if possible)
  • Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (void‑for‑vagueness doctrine)
  • United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2010) (first step in vagueness inquiry is the plain text)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Kenneth R. Heyman v. Molly Cooper
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Apr 18, 2022
Citations: 31 F.4th 1315; 21-10259
Docket Number: 21-10259
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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