168 So. 3d 930
Miss.2015Background
- The City of Madison enacted the Rental Inspection and Property Licensing Act (RIPLA), requiring a rental license and certificate of compliance for each dwelling unit; license applicants must give advance consent to inspections and post a $10,000 bond per unit.
- RIPLA makes renting without a license a misdemeanor with daily fines; the building official may inspect “when and as needed,” and RIPLA states the building official may obtain a judicial warrant “by the terms of the Rental License, lease, or rental agreement” if owner/tenant refuse entry.
- Kenneth Crook was prosecuted and convicted under RIPLA for renting 127 Cypress Drive without a rental license after he applied but never posted the bond and thus was not issued a license.
- Crook challenged RIPLA’s inspection provisions as violating the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches; lower courts upheld his convictions, reasoning the warrant provision saved the statute.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited review to whether the warrant provision rendered RIPLA constitutional, and reversed Crook’s convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Crook's Argument | City of Madison's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RIPLA’s inspection provisions (advance consent + warrant provision) violate the Fourth Amendment | RIPLA coerces advance consent to warrantless searches and its warrant provision permits warrants to issue without probable cause | RIPLA contains a warrant procedure; if owner/tenant refuse, the City must obtain a judicial warrant, so searches are not warrantless | Held unconstitutional: RIPLA’s warrant clause allows warrants “by the terms of the Rental License,” a standard less than probable cause, so inspection provisions are facially invalid |
| Whether Crook has standing to challenge RIPLA | Crook argued his prosecution for unlicensed renting created a concrete adverse effect | City disputed nothing dispositive about standing | Court: Crook has standing because he suffered a distinct adverse effect (prosecution) from the ordinance |
| Whether the defective inspection provisions are severable from RIPLA’s remainder | N/A (Crook sought relief freeing him from penalties under the unconstitutional condition) | City relied on severability clause to preserve other provisions | Court: inspection provisions severable; remainder of RIPLA remains operative |
| Whether Crook’s conviction must be reversed/acquitted given the unconstitutionality | N/A (relief sought was reversal/acquittal) | City argued conviction was proper because Crook never obtained a license (and thus never consented) | Court: reversed and rendered—Crook’s convictions vacated because they depended on a license conditioned on an unconstitutional consent-to-search requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative inspections are significant Fourth Amendment intrusions and warrants for inspections require probable cause adapted to inspection context)
- See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (consent or a warrant is required for administrative entries on nonpublic commercial premises)
- Mann v. Calumet City, Ill., 588 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2009) (ordinances survive Fourth Amendment challenge when they require a warrant to inspect over an owner’s objection)
- Dearmore v. City of Garland, 400 F.Supp.2d 894 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (advance-consent rental permit scheme that penalized refusal was unconstitutional)
- Sokolov v. Village of Freeport, 52 N.Y.2d 341 (1981) (landlord permit scheme coercing advance consent to inspections held unconstitutional)
- Wilson v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St.2d 138 (1976) (ordinance coercing consent by threat of criminal penalty violated the Fourth Amendment)