Kenneth Lee Doss v. State of Iowa
961 N.W.2d 701
| Iowa | 2021Background
- In 2007 Doss pleaded guilty to lascivious acts with a child (class C felony); the court warned he would be "on probation for life" and ordered completion of sex-offender-treatment-program (SOTP) and a lifetime special parole under Iowa Code § 903B.1.
- Doss later violated probation, served prison time, and was paroled in 2015; he signed parole agreements (2015, 2016) and an SOTP rules contract (Oct. 31, 2016) imposing conditions (e.g., no internet use, no dating, no contact with minors without approval, no outside counseling, no church attendance while in SOTP).
- Within weeks of release Doss violated SOTP/parole (missed groups; accessed porn and dating sites; had an unauthorized sexual relationship with an ex-offender and was photographed holding her two-year-old), leading to parole revocation and return to custody.
- Doss filed a postconviction-relief (PCR) application asserting (1) ineffective assistance of plea counsel for failure to inform him, at the 2007 plea, of the specific future parole/SOTP conditions and (2) that various SOTP/parole conditions violated his First Amendment/free-association rights.
- The district court denied relief; the court of appeals affirmed; the Iowa Supreme Court granted further review and affirmed—holding parole/SOTP conditions are collateral (not required to be detailed at plea) and that the challenged conditions were constitutional as applied to Doss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty to disclose parole/SOTP conditions at plea | Doss: plea counsel was ineffective for not informing him of specific lifetime-parole and SOTP rules in 2007; thus plea involuntary | State: court/counsel need only advise direct consequences (max/min, existence of special sentence); specific future administrative conditions are collateral and not required at plea | Held: conditions are collateral, often determined later by parole/DOC, and need not be disclosed at plea; no breach of essential duty shown |
| Misleading advice about special sentence | Doss: counsel misinformed him that supervision was merely monitoring and obeying law would suffice | State: record (sentencing colloquy) warned of lifetime supervision, SOTP, and possible imprisonment for noncompliance; counsel/discussion not materially misleading | Held: record undermines Doss’s claim of being misled; no ineffective assistance established |
| Prejudice from counsel's alleged failure | Doss: would not have pled guilty if advised of conditions | State: contemporaneous record (plea terms, dismissed charges, risk of prison if convicted) and Doss’s conduct undermine claim he would have insisted on trial | Held: Doss failed to show reasonable probability he would have refused the plea; no prejudice |
| Constitutionality of SOTP/parole conditions (internet, dating, contact with minors, church attendance, independent counseling) as-applied | Doss: restrictions violate First Amendment freedoms of speech and association | State: conditions are reasonably related to rehabilitation and public safety for a sex offender on parole/SOTP and are administratively adjustable | Held: court rejects Doss’s as-applied First Amendment challenges to dating and contact-with-minors restrictions (limited to SOTP duration with ability to seek approval); internet claim not preserved; church/independent-counsel claims not central to revocation and not considered |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (counsel must advise about deportation consequences; questioned strict direct/collateral distinction)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance standard: duty and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (applying Strickland in guilty-plea context; prejudice requires showing defendant would have insisted on trial)
- State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1998) (distinguishing direct and collateral consequences for plea colloquy)
- State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676 (Iowa 2016) (license-suspension analysis and direct/collateral framework)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole implies conditions and conditional liberty; parolees have reduced liberty)
- Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000) (parole discretion changes over time; administrative decisionmaking informs parole conditions)
- State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288 (Iowa 2010) (struck overly broad probation ban on all contact with minors; requires tailored conditions)