213 So. 3d 982
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- Rashida Wills Jones (38) has schizoaffective and bipolar disorders and is in a community mental-health program after a recent Baker Act involuntary commitment.
- Jones petitioned for a one-year injunction against domestic violence under Fla. Stat. § 741.30 seeking no-contact relief from her parents, Kenneth Wills and Bobbie Akins.
- Her affidavit alleged repeated unwanted calls, harassment, confrontations with her health‑care providers, and threats to sue providers after a Baker Act hearing.
- Parents testified they repeatedly intervened to obtain mental-health care (including initiating a Baker Act proceeding), sought guardianship at times, and denied stalking or domestic-violence conduct.
- The trial court granted the injunction, finding the parents’ conduct disrupted Jones’s stability and constituted an overt act warranting no-contact relief.
- Parents appealed, arguing the alleged conduct did not meet statutory harassment/stalking standards required for an injunction against domestic violence.
Issues
| Issue | Jones' Argument | Parents' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence supported a domestic-violence injunction based on harassment/stalking | Parents repeatedly harassed and threatened providers and Jones, causing substantial emotional distress and serving no legitimate purpose | Parents’ actions (including seeking Baker Act and guardianship) served legitimate purposes; alleged conduct was uncivil but not malicious harassment or a threat of imminent violence | Reversed: evidence legally insufficient for domestic-violence injunction; statute requires more than uncivil or well‑intentioned but intrusive conduct |
| Whether requests/reports to authorities (Baker Act) can constitute harassment | Baker Act efforts were harassing and part of course of conduct | Unfounded/repeated reports or requests for judicial relief do not support injunctions; many reports have legitimate purpose | Confirmed: requesting civil commitment does not, by itself, constitute legally sufficient harassment to support an injunction |
| Whether medical professionals’ recommendation to avoid parents justifies injunction | Medical testimony that parents should keep distance shows danger and need for injunctive relief | Clinical recommendations do not replace statutory standard showing malicious harassment or threat of imminent violence | Court: clinical concern is relevant but other remedies (trespass warnings, agency interventions) may be more appropriate than a domestic-violence injunction |
| Standard for emotional‑distress inquiry in harassment context | Subjective distress of petitioner warrants protection | Courts apply objective reasonable-person standard; conduct must cause substantial emotional distress and serve no legitimate purpose | Adopted objective standard; here conduct would not cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress sufficient to meet statutory harassment requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Achurra v. Achurra, 80 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (standard of review for injunction against domestic violence is de novo)
- Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (injunction requires malicious harassment including at least a threat of imminent violence)
- Olin v. Roberts, 42 So. 3d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (reports/complaints to authorities, even if repeated, do not, by themselves, support an injunction)
- McMath v. Biernacki, 776 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (use objective reasonable-person standard to assess substantial emotional distress)
- Randolph v. Rich, 58 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (general relationship problems and uncivil behavior insufficient for injunction)
- Jones v. Jackson, 67 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (intimidating calls/texts that would not cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress do not support injunction)
- Polanco v. Cordeiro, 67 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (injunctions are limited to egregious statutory conduct, not a remedy for uncivil behavior)
- Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (general harassment does not constitute domestic violence under statute)
