Kendrick v. the State, 335 Ga. App. 766

Kendrick was stopped for traffic violations, performed field sobriety tests, was arrested, handcuffed, read the statutory implied-consent breath-test notice, and answered “yes.”
About 20 minutes after arrest she provided a breath sample that showed a .15 BAC.
Kendrick moved to suppress breath-test evidence, arguing she did not freely and voluntarily consent under Williams v. State; the suppression hearing focused on voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances.
Trial court found Kendrick coherent, not extremely intoxicated, not threatened or forced, and that she voluntarily consented; trial court viewed body-camera/video and credited officer testimony.
On interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals reviewed voluntariness de novo and considered whether an affirmative response to the implied-consent wording can, under the totality of the circumstances, constitute actual consent.
The Court affirmed, holding that an affirmative statutory response may be sufficient absent evidence of coercion, and that here the State met its burden to prove voluntary consent.

Issue	Kendrick's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Kendrick freely and voluntarily consented to breath testing under the Fourth Amendment post-Williams	Her “yes” was involuntary because the implied-consent language and her handcuffed/arrested condition coerced acquiescence; she thought test was mandatory	The implied-consent notice accurately informed her of choice and consequences; no force, threats, or extreme impairment; affirmative answer can be sufficient under totality of circumstances	The court held consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances; an affirmative answer to implied-consent can suffice absent indicia of coercion
Whether Williams requires more than statutory implied-consent recitation in every case	Williams requires proving more than mere statutory reading in all cases	Williams requires a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis; statutory answer is a relevant factor and may suffice when not shown involuntary	The court held Williams rejected a per se rule but does not impose a per se rule requiring more than the statutory consent in every case; totality test governs

Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 (Georgia 2015) (trial courts must assess voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances rather than treating statutory implied consent as per se consent)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (consent standard under the Fourth Amendment; voluntariness examined under totality of the circumstances)
Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (consent involuntary where officers used intimidation and threats)
Meiklejohn v. State, 281 Ga. App. 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (pre-Williams authority treating affirmative response to implied-consent reading as sufficient)
State v. Fulghum, 261 Ga. App. 594 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (standard of review and totality approach to voluntariness)
State v. Austin, 310 Ga. App. 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (factors relevant to consent include age, education, advisement, and psychological impact)