Ken Smith, V. Kent School District No 415, 82613-1

Background

Kent School Board created a Fiscal Recovery Task Force (advisory only) to advise on budget matters; the Board's Action Plan initially stated Task Force meetings were subject to open meetings law but left meeting openness to the Task Force’s discretion.
On March 15, 2019 the Task Force held a closed meeting (no Board quorum present); Kenneth Smith and Lori Waight were denied entry.
Smith filed internal complaints under District policy 4312/4312P (employee/program complaint process), first to Chief Operations Officer Israel Vela, then to Superintendent Calvin Watts, alleging an OPMA violation and failure to follow complaint procedures.
District responded that (1) the Task Force was advisory and did not act as a governing body at the March 15 meeting, so OPMA did not apply, and (2) the complaint process under 4312/4312P had been followed; the Board later amended the Action Plan to clarify when OPMA applies.
Smith and Waight appealed to superior court under RCW 28A.645.010 more than a year after the meeting; the superior court dismissed for lack of an appealable decision and other grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the District’s rejection of Smith’s OPMA claim is appealable under RCW 28A.645.010	Smith argued District officials’ conclusions denying an OPMA violation and rejecting his grievance are "decisions or orders" subject to judicial review under RCW 28A.645.010	District argued it lacked authority to adjudicate OPMA claims and its legal conclusions are not appealable under RCW 28A.645.010; Smith had an OPMA remedy under RCW 42.30.120	Not appealable: District’s legal determination of an OPMA claim is not an appealable "decision or order" under RCW 28A.645.010.
Whether the Task Force’s closed March 15 meeting violated the OPMA	Smith argued the closure and exclusion violated OPMA and the Board’s Action Plan	District argued Task Force was only advisory, the March 15 meeting did not act on behalf of the governing body (no quorum), and OPMA therefore did not apply	Held: No OPMA violation; advisory committees not "governing body" here and meeting was internal discussion.
Whether the District’s handling of Smith’s 4312/4312P complaints was reviewable and, if so, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law	Smith argued District failed to follow its complaint policy and was untimely and unfair	District argued it followed 4312/4312P (investigation and recommendations), policy does not bind Board to further action, and no unreasonable delay shown	Held: Even if reviewable, District action was administrative (not quasi-judicial) and not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Standing to challenge other district policies and actions	Smith sought to challenge Board’s compliance with various policies (policy review, auditing, finances)	District argued Smith lacks "aggrieved" status—no personal or pecuniary interest—so no standing under RCW 28A.645.010	Held: Smith lacks standing to bring those policy challenges; dismissal appropriate.

Key Cases Cited

Mountain View Sch. v. Issaquah Sch. Dist. No. 411, 58 Wn. App. 630 (1990) (defines scope of "decision or order" under predecessor statute)
Derrey v. Toppenish Sch. Dist. No. 202, 69 Wn. App. 610 (1993) (school district’s denial of legal claim not appealable under statute)
State St. Office Bldg. v. Sedro Woolley Sch. Dist. No. 101, 57 Wn. App. 657 (1990) (district determination of its authority is not an appealable order)
Citizens All. for Prop. Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County, 184 Wn.2d 428 (2015) (advisory committees are not "governing body" under OPMA when only providing internal advice)
Haynes v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 111 Wn.2d 250 (1988) (administrative decisions reviewed for arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law)
Yaw v. Walla Walla Sch. Dist. 140, 106 Wn.2d 408 (1986) (scope of judicial review over school administrative action)
Briggs v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 165 Wn. App. 286 (2011) (defines "aggrieved" for standing under RCW 28A.645.010)
State v. Taylor, 150 Wn.2d 599 (2003) (clarifies that mere disappointment or hurt feelings do not establish "aggrieved" status)
Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 97 Wn.2d 215 (1982) (factors to determine whether administrative action is quasi-judicial)
Porter v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 160 Wn. App. 872 (2011) (definition and standard for arbitrary and capricious agency action)