Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528

Dexter Kemp was convicted in 2011 of drug and gun offenses; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in Nov. 2013 and Kemp did not seek certiorari.
Two codefendants sought rehearing; the Eleventh Circuit denied those rehearing petitions in May 2014.
Kemp filed a §2255 motion in April 2015; the District Court dismissed it as untimely under 28 U.S.C. §2255(f)(1) (one-year rule); Kemp did not appeal that dismissal.
In June 2018 Kemp moved to reopen under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), invoking 60(b)(6) but arguing the District Court had legally erred about when his §2255 limitations period began (i.e., after rehearing denials), which would have made his §2255 timely.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed Kemp’s §2255 would have been timely but held Kemp’s Rule 60(b) motion alleged a judicial legal error and thus fell under Rule 60(b)(1) (subject to the one‑year limit), making his 2018 motion untimely.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law and held that it does, without importing an “obviousness” limitation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Kemp)	Defendant's Argument (U.S.)	Held
Whether “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) covers a judge’s error of law	“Mistake” should be limited to non‑judicial or factual errors; judicial legal errors belong in Rule 60(b)(6)	“Mistake” includes judicial legal errors; Kemp’s motion alleged such an error	“Mistake” includes a judge’s errors of law; Kemp’s 60(b) motion was therefore governed by 60(b)(1) and its one‑year constraint
Whether “mistake” should be limited to only “obvious” legal errors to reflect equity practice and prevent overlap with other rules	N/A (argues narrow reading to avoid overlap/gamesmanship)	If limited to only “obvious” errors, Rule 60(b)(1) would reflect historical equity practice	Court rejects an “obviousness” gloss as unsupported by text, history, or administrability concerns; no such limitation imposed

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (explains Rule 60(b) and limits on habeas collateral relief)
Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003) (when a criminal judgment becomes final for §2255 purposes)
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (postjudgment relief principles)
Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief in extraordinary circumstances, including changed law)
Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960) (acknowledging clear changes in law may justify extraordinary relief)
Snell v. Insurance Co., 98 U.S. 85 (1878) (equity practice historically granted relief for only flagrant legal errors)
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (2012) (interpretive principle that the specific governs the general)
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (2014) (canon on drafting choices and possible alternatives)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (limits of transplanting meanings from other legal contexts)