950 F.3d 795
11th Cir.2020Background
- In 2018 Florida voters enacted Amendment 4, restoring voting rights to felons "upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation."
- The Florida Legislature implemented Amendment 4 with SB 7066, which interpreted "completion of all terms of sentence" to include payment of all legal financial obligations (LFOs: fines, fees, restitution).
- Seventeen named plaintiffs—former felons who claim they completed other sentence terms but are indigent and cannot pay outstanding LFOs—filed a § 1983 suit challenging the LFO requirement as unconstitutional as applied.
- The district court issued a preliminary injunction allowing those plaintiffs to register and vote if they can show a genuine inability to pay; the State appealed.
- The Florida Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion (while the appeal was pending) concluding Amendment 4 requires payment of LFOs; the Eleventh Circuit treated that as conclusive state-law interpretation.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to these plaintiffs, holding that heightened scrutiny applies and that the LFO requirement is likely unconstitutional as applied to indigent plaintiffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether requiring payment of LFOs before re-enfranchisement violates Equal Protection as applied to indigent felons | Jones: withholding re-enfranchisement from those genuinely unable to pay is wealth-based punishment and violates equal protection | State: felons have no fundamental right to vote; rational-basis review applies and LFO requirement is rationally related to revenue collection, deterrence, and administrability | Court: heightened scrutiny applies (wealth + criminal justice + franchise). Under that test, the LFO requirement is likely unconstitutional as applied to those genuinely unable to pay; affirmed injunction. |
| Proper level of scrutiny (rational basis vs heightened) | Plaintiffs: Supreme Court precedents (Griffin/Bearden/Harper/M.L.B.) require heightened review where wealth determines access to criminal-justice benefits or the franchise | State: rational basis governs because wealth is not a suspect class and felons may be disenfranchised under Richardson | Court: applied heightened scrutiny—wealth classifications warrant heightened review in two areas (administration of criminal justice and voting) and Florida’s scheme punishes indigent felons more harshly. |
| Whether plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm and equitable factors for a preliminary injunction | Plaintiffs: being denied the right to vote in an election is irreparable; harms outweigh administrative burdens on the State | State: injunction harms interests in enforcing laws, election integrity, and imposes substantial administrative burdens | Court: voting loss is irreparable; district court did not abuse discretion on balance of harms or public-interest factors; injunction appropriate. |
| Severability — whether invalidating the LFO application requires invalidating Amendment 4 entirely | Plaintiffs: the unconstitutional application can be severed, preserving Amendment 4’s core | State: the LFO condition was central to Amendment 4 and not severable | Court: under Florida severability rules, the as-applied invalidation is plausibly severable on this record; burden on State to prove otherwise, which it did not meet preliminarily. |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1974) (states may disenfranchise felons under the Fourteenth Amendment)
- Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (U.S. 1983) (cannot revoke probation or extend punishment for inability to pay fines where inability is through no fault of the defendant)
- Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (U.S. 1966) (wealth-based voter qualifications violate Equal Protection)
- Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (U.S. 1956) (indigent defendants cannot be denied appellate review by reason of poverty)
- M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (U.S. 1996) (recognizing exceptions to rational-basis scrutiny for wealth classifications affecting the franchise and criminal-justice processes)
- Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (U.S. 1970) (cannot extend imprisonment beyond statutory maximum because indigent cannot pay fine)
- Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (U.S. 1971) (cannot jail indigent for inability to pay fine)
- Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (U.S. 1978) (striking down a wealth-based precondition to marriage)
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (U.S. 1964) (describing voting as fundamental; careful scrutiny needed for infringements)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (U.S. 1985) (rational-basis-as-applied scrutiny where legislation appears to single out a politically unpopular group)