Kelsey v. Comm'r of Corr.
189 A.3d 578
| Conn. | 2018Background
- Petitioner Kelsey filed a second habeas petition in March 2017 more than two years after finality of his prior habeas judgment; Commissioner moved under General Statutes § 52-470(d) to order Kelsey to show cause why the untimely petition should proceed.
- Habeas court declined to act on the respondent’s motion, concluding § 52-470(b)(1) required waiting until the close of all pleadings.
- Respondent sought reconsideration; court again denied relief, holding it lacked discretion to act before pleadings closed.
- Chief Justice certified an interlocutory public-interest appeal to the Supreme Court.
- The legal question: whether § 52-470 divests the habeas court of discretion as to when it must issue an order to show cause on timeliness challenges under § 52-470(e).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 52-470(b) required the court to wait until close of pleadings before acting on a respondent’s motion to show cause on timeliness | Kelsey: § 52-470(b) controls; court must wait for close of pleadings | Commissioner: § 52-470(b) does not apply to timeliness challenges | Court: § 52-470(b) applies to "good cause for trial" only; it was misapplied here |
| Whether § 52-470(e) governs respondent’s motion to show cause for delay | Kelsey: § 52-470(e) applies but leaves timing to court discretion | Commissioner: § 52-470(e) requires the court to issue the order upon request (mandatory/ immediate) | Court: § 52-470(e) applies and does not impose a timing constraint; court retains discretion when to act |
| Whether § 52-470(e)’s use of "shall" imposes an immediate temporal duty | Commissioner: "shall" means mandatory immediate action upon request | Kelsey: "shall" requires issuance of order but not immediate timing; court retains discretion | Court: "shall" obligates court to address issue upon request but does not fix timing; no express time limit in statute |
| How to balance expeditious habeas processing and due process when addressing timeliness | Commissioner: emphasis on expediency to screen untimely petitions | Kelsey: ensure meaningful opportunity and due process before dismissal | Court: court must balance both; § 52-470(e) requires a "meaningful opportunity" to rebut and allows discretion to fashion procedures and timing |
Key Cases Cited
- Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 548, 153 A.3d 1233 (Conn. 2017) (discussing 2012 habeas reforms and § 52-470 purpose)
- Hogewoning v. Hogewoning, 117 Conn. 264, 167 A. 813 (Conn. 1933) (interpreting "in a summary way" as prompt resolution)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (due process requires meaningful opportunity to be heard)
- James L. v. Commissioner of Correction, 245 Conn. 132, 712 A.2d 947 (Conn. 1998) (courts must fashion remedies appropriate to vindicate constitutional rights)
- Downs v. Trias, 306 Conn. 81, 49 A.3d 180 (Conn. 2012) (trial court discretionary powers to control pleadings and prevent prejudice)