Kelly Thomas v. Standard Casualty Company, Mike Madden, Prestige Claim Service, Mark Anderson, and Scott Schmidt
02-17-00335-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 14, 2017Background
- Kelly Thomas (pro se) sued Standard Casualty, Mike Madden, Prestige Claim Service, Mark Anderson, and Scott Schmidt for breach of contract, insurance-code violations (chs. 541, 542), DTPA violations, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing.
- Thomas filed a "Motion to Compel Arbitration" asking the court to compel ADR under Business & Commerce § 17.5051, Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 154.021, and Insurance Code § 541.161.
- The trial court held a hearing and denied Thomas’s motion to compel arbitration.
- Thomas filed an interlocutory appeal relying on Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.098(a)(1), which permits appeals from denials of applications to compel arbitration made under § 171.021.
- Appellees moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing Thomas had not sought relief under § 171.021 (which requires an agreement to arbitrate).
- The court concluded Thomas never alleged or established an arbitration agreement under § 171.021 and therefore § 171.098(a)(1) did not authorize her interlocutory appeal; the court dismissed the appeal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the interlocutory order denying Thomas’s motion to compel arbitration is appealable under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.098(a)(1) | Thomas asserted § 171.098(a)(1) authorizes her interlocutory appeal from the denial of her motion to compel arbitration. | Appellees argued the motion was not an application under § 171.021 because Thomas did not allege an arbitration agreement; thus § 171.098(a)(1) does not apply. | The court held § 171.098(a)(1) does not authorize the appeal because Thomas did not proceed under § 171.021 (no arbitration agreement alleged). |
| Whether Thomas’s statutory bases (Bus. & Com. § 17.5051; Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 154.021; Ins. Code § 541.161) suffice to invoke § 171.098(a)(1) appeal rights | Thomas relied on those statutes to compel ADR and treated the denial as appealable under § 171.098(a)(1). | Appellees contended those statutes address mediation/ADR referral and are distinct from § 171.021’s enforcement of arbitration agreements. | The court held those statutory routes are distinct from § 171.021 and do not create interlocutory appeal rights under § 171.098(a)(1). |
| Whether the trial court’s denial should be reviewed despite procedural defects in invocation of § 171.098(a)(1) | Thomas sought review of the denial on its merits via interlocutory appeal. | Appellees argued lack of statutory authorization deprives the appellate court of subject-matter jurisdiction. | The court concluded no statute authorized the interlocutory appeal and dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. |
| Relief on ancillary motions filed by Thomas in the appellate court | Thomas filed motions (e.g., Motion to Strike Filings) seeking action from the appellate court. | Appellees argued the appellate court should dismiss the appeal and not act on ancillary motions. | Because the court lacked jurisdiction, it took no action on Thomas’s ancillary motions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (interlocutory appeals permitted only when authorized by statute)
- Ellis v. Schlimmer, 337 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2011) (to compel arbitration under § 171.021, a party must establish a valid arbitration agreement)