Kelly Paton v. Geico General Insurance Co.
190 So. 3d 1047
| Fla. | 2016Background
- Kelly Patón obtained a jury verdict against GEICO on an underinsured motorist/bad-faith claim; plaintiff later sought attorney’s fees and moved for discovery of GEICO’s counsel billing records and related fee information.
- Trial court ordered production of billing records (with redaction of privileged material) and required answers to lodestar/multiplier interrogatories; GEICO objected as privileged and irrelevant.
- GEICO petitioned the Fourth District for certiorari; the Fourth District quashed the trial court orders, applying Estilien/Hillman and requiring a special showing that opposing counsel records are actually relevant, necessary, and not obtainable elsewhere.
- Patón invoked conflict with this Court’s Palma decision (which relied on opposing counsel hours in assessing reasonableness and multiplier) and sought review in the Florida Supreme Court.
- The Florida Supreme Court held that defendant-insurer counsel’s hours are relevant to contested fee claims under sections 624.155 and 627.428, discovery (with redactions) is within trial-court discretion, and the Fourth District erred in granting certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are opposing counsel’s billing records discoverable in a contested attorney-fee proceeding? | Patón: records are relevant to reasonableness of hours; trial court may order discovery with privilege redactions. | GEICO: records are privileged/work product and only marginally relevant; special showing required per Estilien/Hillman. | Yes; hours spent by defendant’s counsel are relevant and discoverable when fees are contested; trial court has discretion and may require redaction. |
| Must a party make a special showing (relevance, necessity, no equivalent source) before obtaining opposing counsel’s billing records? | Patón: no special precondition beyond relevancy and privilege protection; substantial equivalent often only available from opposing party. | GEICO: Estilien/Hillman require a heightened three-part showing before production. | No heightened showing required; trial court may order production of non-privileged portions and protect privileged material. |
| Does certiorari lie to review the trial court orders compelling such discovery? | Patón: certiorari was improvidently granted; interlocutory discovery orders do not warrant extraordinary relief absent departure from essential requirements and irreparable harm. | GEICO: sought certiorari to prevent disclosure of privileged or irrelevant material. | Certiorari was improperly used by the Fourth District; the orders did not depart from essential requirements and did not cause irreparable harm. |
| Is Palma inconsistent with allowing discovery of opposing counsel’s hours? | Patón: Palma treated opposing counsel hours as relevant evidence for fee reasonableness, supporting discoverability. | GEICO: Paton II stated opposing counsel billing is "at best marginally relevant," conflicting with Palma. | Court clarifies Palma supports relevance of opposing counsel hours; Paton II’s contrary statement was quashed. |
Key Cases Cited
- State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Palma, 555 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1990) (opposing counsel hours are relevant to lodestar/multiplier and fee reasonableness)
- HCA Health Servs. of Fla. v. Hillman, 870 So.2d 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (billing records may be work product/privileged and require showing before compelled production)
- Estilien v. Dyda, 93 So.3d 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (applied Hillman to restrict discovery of opposing counsel billing records)
- Anderson Columbia Co. v. Brown, 902 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (discovery of opposing counsel time/fees left to trial-court discretion where order did not compel privileged mental impressions)
- Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. Enter., 99 So.3d 450 (Fla. 2012) (broader relevancy standard for discovery and limits on certiorari as extraordinary relief)