Kelly Jordan v. Safeco Insurance Co. of IL
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 763
| 8th Cir. | 2014Background
- Kelly Jordan, a pedestrian, was injured in 2009; she was named insured on five Safeco policies covering five vehicles and had $100,000 UIM per vehicle.
- The driver’s insurer paid $100,000 to Jordan and her husband; Jordan sought $500,000, asserting stacked UIM across all policies.
- Safeco paid $100,000 and argued the policies’ Other Insurance clause prohibits stacking of UIM across multiple policies.
- The district court concluded Ritchie v. Allied Property & Casualty Ins. Co. limited stacking to situations where the insured occupies a non-owned vehicle, and granted Safeco summary judgment.
- Jordan moved for partial summary judgment; the district court denied it and dismissed the case; the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for partial summary judgment.
- Missouri law governs interpretation of the policies; the court discussed public policy and ambiguity in stacking provisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Other Insurance clause permits stacking UIM across policies | Jordan contends ambiguity allows stacking per Ritchie. | Safeco argues clause is excess only, per policy language. | Ambiguity requires stacking; not limited to non-owned-vehicle occupancy. |
| Whether occupancy of a non-owned vehicle is required under the clause | No occupancy requirement implied by clause language itself. | Clause contemplates occupancy in a non-owned vehicle. | No occupancy requirement reads into the clause; ambiguity favors Jordan. |
| Whether Ritchie limits stacking to non-owned-vehicle occupancy scenarios | Ritchie supports stacking in similar language contexts. | Ritchie is limited to non-owned-vehicle occupancy and would not apply here. | Ritchie does not expressly limit to occupancy; Missouri Supreme Court would likely allow stacking here. |
| Whether Kennedy controls, prohibiting stacking under Safeco policies | Kennedy supports stacking despite no-stacking clauses. | Kennedy distinguishes policy language; not controlling post-Ritchie. | Kennedy not controlling; Ritchie guidance prevails for ambiguity favoring stacking. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ritchie v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 307 S.W.3d 132 (Mo. 2009) (ambiguity permits stacking when excess coverage promise conflicts with no-stacking provisions)
- Long v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 351 S.W.3d 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (no-stacking language where unambiguous)
- Lynch v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (ambiguity in stacking provisions when policy language conflicts)
- Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129 (Mo. 2007) (interpretation of policy provisions in ambiguity)
- Manner v. Schiermeier, 393 S.W.3d 58 (Mo. 2013) (ambiguity resolved in favor of insured when provisions conflict)
- Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Co. of Missouri, 992 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (occupancy explicit in occupancy-based clause)
- Kennedy v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 413 S.W.3d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (Kennedy treated differently from Ritchie on stacking language)
- Clark v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 92 S.W.3d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (occupancy language affects interpretation)
- Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2010) (predictive state-law application in diversity cases)