Kelly Jo Ivey v. State
01-15-00804-CR
| Tex. App. | Aug 8, 2017Background
- Kelly Jo Ivey was indicted for and convicted of first-degree intoxication manslaughter for causing the death of on‑duty Deputy J. Valdez III by driving a vehicle while intoxicated; jury assessed 60 years and a $10,000 fine.
- After a head‑on collision, Ivey (and her husband) were treated at a hospital; Valdez died. At the hospital Ivey told Deputy Albers she had been driving and had ingested methamphetamines; she was arrested.
- Police reconstruction and toxicology confirmed methamphetamine in Ivey’s blood and concluded Ivey’s vehicle was in the wrong lane and her impairment caused the collision. Several witnesses and injury patterns supported that Ivey was the driver.
- Before trial Ivey moved to suppress her recorded hospital statement, arguing it was the product of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings; the trial court denied suppression.
- At punishment Ivey pleaded true to an enhancement (prior felony drug possession) and the State presented victim‑impact testimony (including from the decedent’s 11‑year‑old son); the prosecutor made a plea for law enforcement invoking September 11. Ivey objected; the trial court overruled.
- On appeal Ivey challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence that she was the driver, (2) denial of her suppression motion, (3) overruling of objection to prosecutor’s punishment argument, and (4) ineffective assistance for failing to object to victim‑impact testimony about the family dog. The court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Ivey's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — whether evidence proved Ivey operated the vehicle | Evidence was insufficient to prove she was driver; others saw husband enter driver side | Ivey admitted she was driving in recorded hospital statement; reconstruction, injuries, and other testimony support driver finding | Affirmed — evidence sufficient to support that Ivey operated the vehicle |
| Suppression — whether hospital statement was product of custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings | Albers had probable cause and didn’t tell Ivey she was free to leave; thus she was in custody and warnings required | Ivey was not restrained to degree associated with formal arrest; Albers said she was not under arrest and she could have ended interview; Miranda not required | Affirmed — not custodial; statement admissible |
| Improper jury argument at punishment — prosecutor asked peace officers to stand and referenced September 11 | Argument was highly prejudicial and exceeded permissible plea for law enforcement | Argument was a permissible plea for law enforcement in punishment phase and put moral responsibility on jurors | Affirmed — trial court within reasonable discretion to allow argument |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel — failure to object to child’s testimony about the family dog | Counsel should have objected; testimony was unduly prejudicial victim‑impact evidence | Victim‑impact evidence is admissible at punishment if relevant; record silent on counsel’s strategy; no showing of deficient performance | Affirmed — record does not show deficient performance; claim not firmly founded in record |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings)
- Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (objective custody test; reasonable‑person standard)
- Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (U.S. 1994) (custody depends on compulsory aspect of interrogation, not strength of suspicion)
- Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (custody determination mixed question; deference rules)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (sufficiency review standard viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
- Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (defendant bears initial burden to prove custodial interrogation)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong ineffective‑assistance standard)
- Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (categories of permissible jury argument)
- Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (permissible law‑enforcement plea in punishment argument)
- Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (victim‑impact evidence admissible at punishment but may be excluded if unfairly prejudicial)