852 N.W.2d 718
Neb.2014Background
- Kelliher and Soundy formed Clover, each initially owning 50%; disputes arose after Soundy bought out Kelliher (2007) and later allegedly agreed orally for Kelliher to regain interest by managing and funding the bar.
- Soundy sold Clover’s sole asset (a bar property) to Schijohn, L.L.C.; Kelliher sued alleging Soundy lacked authority to sell and that Schijohn knew of Kelliher’s claim, asserting a quiet title claim among others.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Schijohn on the quiet title claim, finding Schijohn could rely on Soundy’s apparent authority; Kelliher’s motion to vacate was denied but the order was certified and an appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals (Kelliher did not seek further review).
- After remand Schijohn moved to cancel Kelliher’s recorded notice of lis pendens, citing a prospective buyer; the district court granted cancellation in June 2013 despite a scheduled trial and while appeal time remained.
- Kelliher appealed the cancellation order; he conceded the order was nonfinal but argued it was reviewable under the collateral-order doctrine and that cancellation was improper while appeal rights remained.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction: collateral-order review of lis pendens cancellation | Kelliher: order is collateral and immediately appealable because cancellation conclusively determined the notice and would be unreviewable later | Schijohn: order nonfinal; implies not immediately appealable | Court: collateral-order doctrine applies — order conclusively determined notice, would be effectively unreviewable, and cancellation is separate from merits under §25-531 |
| Whether “good cause” includes merits of the underlying action | Kelliher: merits are irrelevant while time to appeal remains; cancellation based on dismissal of quiet title was improper | Schijohn: statute gives broad discretion; dismissal of quiet title and need to sell justify cancellation | Court: “good cause” does not include consideration of the action’s merits while appeal time remains; cancellation on that basis was error |
| Whether a prospective purchaser constitutes good cause | Kelliher: prospective sale is not good cause because lis pendens protects against third-party transfers that would defeat relief | Schijohn: existence of buyer and need for clear title justify cancellation | Court: prospective purchaser is not good cause; lis pendens purpose is to prevent such third-party acquisitions |
Key Cases Cited
- Merrill v. Wright, 65 Neb. 794, 91 N.W. 697 (Neb. 1902) (interpreting Nebraska lis pendens statute in light of the common-law rule and limiting reach to interests dependent on the pending suit)
- Hallie Mgmt. Co. v. Perry, 272 Neb. 81, 718 N.W.2d 531 (Neb. 2006) (discusses limits on immediate appellate review and the collateral-order doctrine)
- Coffin v. Old Line Life Ins. Co., 138 Neb. 857, 295 N.W. 884 (Neb. 1941) (describes lis pendens purpose: prevent third-party acquisitions during litigation that would frustrate relief)
- Orange Cty. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 52 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (federal authority on when lis pendens cancellation is tied to merits versus statutory language)
