Kellie Lynn Dominy-Gatz v. State
05-15-01194-CR
| Tex. App. | Dec 16, 2016Background
- At ~1:15 a.m., Officer Monroe surveilled Daniel Pena (a known meth dealer) and observed a silver car (driven by Kellie Dominy-Gatz) park beside Pena at a Walmart, enter the store briefly together, then follow Pena to a nearby Motel 6.
- Monroe observed the silver car’s rear license-plate illumination was out and relayed that information to Officer Larouche, who stopped the parked silver car at Motel 6 for the traffic violation.
- During the stop Larouche saw in plain view an open alcoholic container (claimed by Dominy‑Gatz’s 19‑year‑old daughter) and drug paraphernalia (torch lighter and eyeglass case with a burnt meth pipe end) on the driver’s floorboard; he then searched the car and found a black pouch containing pipes, baggies, a scrap of crystalline substance, and small packaging bags.
- Dominy‑Gatz made statements both before Miranda warnings (admitting she had met Pena to buy meth but claimed she lacked money) and after warnings; lab testing later showed the crystalline substance weighed 6.88 grams of methamphetamine.
- She was charged with possession with intent to deliver (more than 4 g but less than 200 g) and pleaded true to a first enhancement; the trial court convicted and sentenced her to 20 years; on appeal she challenged suppression of evidence and statements and sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dominy‑Gatz) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether the traffic stop and ensuing search were illegal/extended unlawfully | Stop was invalid (information insufficient) and detention was unreasonably extended, so evidence from the warrantless search should be suppressed | Stop was justified by Monroe’s relay that the tag lamp was out; during the stop officers observed paraphernalia and open container that gave reasonable suspicion to continue and search | Stop was lawful (Larouche could rely on fellow officer); detention was not unreasonably extended because reasonable suspicion to investigate additional crimes arose during the stop — suppression denied |
| 2) Whether pre‑Miranda and post‑Miranda statements should be suppressed | Pre‑Miranda statements were custodial and compelled; post‑Miranda statements recorded after a brief off‑camera break violated art. 38.22 recording requirements | Pre‑Miranda statements were made during an investigative detention (not custodial); post‑Miranda statements were a continuation of interrogation and recording gaps did not require re‑warning nor show operator incompetence | Pre‑Miranda statements admissible because not custodial; post‑Miranda statements admissible (continuation of interrogation and recording competent) |
| 3) Sufficiency of the evidence to prove knowing possession and intent to deliver | Meth could have been placed by others (daughter or Pena); proximity alone insufficient to prove knowing possession | Multiple affirmative links (paraphernalia in plain view, pouch in driver’s seat, incriminating statements, phone calls to known dealer, quantity/packaging consistent with distribution) supported conviction | Evidence was sufficient; a rational juror could find Dominy‑Gatz knowingly possessed meth with intent to deliver |
Key Cases Cited
- Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (standard for reviewing suppression rulings; totality of circumstances for reasonable suspicion)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (framework for investigative stops and scope review)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial‑interrogation warning rule)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (legal‑sufficiency standard for criminal convictions)
- Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (upholding continued detention where facts developed during stop provided reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop)