Kelli Jo Griffin v. Paul Pate, in His Official Capacities as the Secretary of State of Iowa, and Denise Fraise, in Her Official Capacities as the County Auditor of Lee County, Iowa
884 N.W.2d 182
Iowa2016Background
- Kelli Jo Griffin (Iowa resident) was convicted in 2008 of delivery of ≤100 grams of cocaine (Iowa Code §124.401(1)(c)(2)(b), Class C felony), placed on probation, and successfully discharged her sentence in 2013.
- Griffin registered and cast a provisional ballot in a 2013 municipal election; Lee County auditor Denise Fraise rejected the ballot based on Griffin’s felony conviction.
- Griffin was criminally charged for registering/voting; she was acquitted of perjury. She then sued the governor, secretary of state, and auditor seeking a declaration that her felony did not disqualify her from voting and related relief.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the state, holding a conviction for delivery (a felony) is an "infamous crime" under Iowa Const. art. II, §5 and that the auditor properly rejected Griffin’s ballot.
- On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed: applying historical analysis, statutory practice (Iowa Code §39.3(8)), and comparative precedent, the court held the constitutional phrase "infamous crime" is reasonably understood today to mean felony, so Griffin’s conviction disqualified her from voting until rights are restored.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether delivery of a controlled substance conviction is an "infamous crime" under Iowa Const. art. II, §5 | Griffin: her felony is not an "infamous crime" that disqualifies her from voting | State: "infamous crime" includes felonies; legislature defined it as such (Iowa Code §39.3(8)) | Held: Yes — "infamous crime" includes felony; conviction disqualified Griffin from voting until restoration |
| Whether the 1994 statutory definition (infamous crime = felony) is a permissible indicator of contemporary constitutional meaning | Griffin: statute cannot constitutionally broaden disqualification to all felonies unrelated to voting integrity | State: legislative definition reflects community standards and is a proper objective indicium for constitutional interpretation | Held: Court gave substantial weight to the 1994 legislative judgment as reflecting current community standards and affirmed its use in interpretation |
| Whether due process or other statutory/regulatory challenges to Iowa’s voter-registration and restoration procedures invalidate the disqualification | Griffin: post-sentence restoration process and related statutes violate due process and are invalid as applied | State: procedural and restoration mechanisms are lawful; restoration is executive/pardoning power | Held: Court did not reach merits of broad statutory due-process claims because Griffin’s constitutional disqualification (felony = infamous) disposed of the case; rejected her as-applied challenges dependent on that predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 2014) (prior Iowa plurality analyzing "infamous crime" and holding felony is a threshold for "particularly serious" offenses)
- Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (U.S. 1958) (Eighth Amendment "evolving standards" approach used for interpreting constitutional phrases)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (use of objective indicia and constitutional text/purpose in evolving-standards analysis)
- Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (U.S. 1885) (discussion of "infamous crime" in context of grand jury/indictment and infamous punishment)
- Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1974) (holding felon disenfranchisement is constitutionally sanctioned by §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment)
- Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. 2011) (adopting an "affront to democratic governance" test for "infamous crime" in Indiana and contrasting approaches)