Kelley Elizabeth Cannon v. State of Tennessee, M2015-01869-CCA-R3-PC

Background

Kelley Elizabeth Cannon was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first-degree premeditated murder (life sentence) for the June 23, 2008 strangulation death of her husband; conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Post-conviction relief was later sought alleging trial counsel ineffective.
Key physical evidence: a latex glove tip found near the victim with a mixture of Cannon’s and the victim’s DNA; a blood/DNA mixture on Cannon’s jeans; fingerprints of Cannon on a closet door and her prints on a partially open window.
Defense theory at trial: physical impossibility (Cannon’s small/waif-like condition made the killing unlikely), inadvertent DNA transfer, and challenges to the strength of the State’s scientific proof. Counsel consulted DNA experts but did not call them at trial.
Post-conviction claims included numerous ineffective-assistance contentions (warrants, DNA/serology handling, failure to argue evidence planting, opening-statement “promises,” use of phone records and a footprint, cross-examination of the child witness, failure to develop victim-character evidence), and that the court improperly denied tearing/touching trial exhibits at the hearing.
The post-conviction court held an extensive evidentiary hearing, denied relief; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, finding counsel’s performance reasonable and strategic and rejecting standalone suppression and demonstration claims as waived or irrelevant.

Issues

Issue	Petitioner’s Argument (Cannon)	State’s Argument	Held
1) Ineffective assistance — failure to challenge search warrants	Counsel should have attacked warrants (lack of specificity/probable cause); strategy to suppress statements was insufficient	Counsel reasonably chose to move to suppress statements that supplied probable cause for warrants; strategic and informed	Denied — counsel’s choice was strategic and not deficient
2) Ineffective assistance — DNA/serology handling and expert use	Counsel mismanaged DNA proof, failed to call defense experts or obtain raw data, and failed to challenge presumptive blood/chain-of-custody	Counsel consulted leading experts, used their advice for cross-examination, reasonably chose not to call them; no chain-of-custody/contamination shown	Denied — preparation and strategy reasonable; no clear prejudice shown
3) Failure to develop planted-evidence theory and use glove/Glaxo evidence	Counsel should have argued the glove tip was planted or shown the glove was cut (not torn) and highlighted Walgreens evidence	No proof evidence was planted; strategic focus on transference and compromised scene; trial court restricted “shoplift” argument	Denied — no proof of planting; counsel’s approach reasonable
4) Post-conviction court denial to allow tearing/touching trial exhibits at hearing	Needed demonstration (tear gloves) to show cut vs. tear and prejudice	Demonstration irrelevant to the DNA result and post-conviction court properly controlled handling of sealed exhibits; court is trier of fact (should not testify)	Denied — court did not abuse discretion; demonstration not material to prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (procedures for advising defendant of right to testify and waiver on the record)
Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1997) (credibility and weight of evidence are trial-court determinations on post-conviction review)
Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2001) (post-conviction factual findings entitled to presumption of correctness on appeal)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance — deficiency and prejudice)
House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508 (Tenn. 2001) (defendant must show counsel’s performance fell below objective reasonableness)
Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975) (standard of competence required of criminal defense counsel)
Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282 (Tenn. 2009) (courts should not second-guess reasonable strategic choices in hindsight)
Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (mere disagreement with counsel’s tactics does not establish ineffective assistance)