Kellard v. Cincinnati
171 N.E.3d 868
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- In 2017 Ohio enacted R.C. 2923.1210 (preempting local restrictions on storing/conveying firearms in privately owned vehicles) and former R.C. 9.68(B) provided that a person who “prevails in a challenge” to a conflicting ordinance/rule is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees.
- Cincinnati’s H.R. 5.1 and Admin. Reg. 49 contained provisions inconsistent with R.C. 2923.1210; the city discussed revisions but did not formally amend the policies for two years.
- On August 15, 2019 Timothy Kellard (a CCW holder and city employee) sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, costs, and damages; he alleged fear of discipline kept him from storing a firearm in his car at work.
- Before the trial court hearing (by August 19, 2019) the city formally amended the policies to comply with R.C. 2923.1210; Kellard nevertheless sought permanent injunctive/declaratory relief and fees.
- The trial court granted declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, damages ($702.96), and about $47,000 in attorneys’ fees. On appeal the court reversed the injunction/declaratory judgment as non-justiciable, held Kellard could still be a prevailing party for fee purposes, but reduced the fee award and affirmed the damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Justiciability of declaratory/injunctive relief | Kellard argued ongoing risk that city could reinstate/enforce unlawful policies warranted relief | City argued its August 19 policy revisions mooted claim and removed any live controversy | Reversed: permanent injunction and declaratory judgment vacated as speculative/non-justiciable once city adopted compliant policies |
| Whether Kellard “prevails in a challenge” under former R.C. 9.68(B) | Kellard argued the suit caused the city to change policies, so he obtained the relief sought and thus prevailed | City argued it already was moving toward revision and Kellard did not truly prevail | Affirmed: court adopts causal/but‑for approach — Kellard prevailed because the record supported causation between the suit and the policy changes |
| Reasonableness of attorneys’ fees (rates and hours) | Kellard sought high hourly rates (benchmarked to Laffey Matrix and prior federal awards) and full billed hours | City challenged both rates and hours, arguing many hours were unreasonable after the policy change mooted injunctive claim | Modified fees: trial court’s hourly rates ($335 for court appearances, $270 out-of-court) upheld; hours reduced to exclude time spent pursuing non‑justiciable injunction after Aug. 19; final awards: Phillips $5,713; Hackett $12,060.50; Stokar $10,336 |
| Damages / class-representative fee request | Kellard sought an additional $5,000 as a class-representative-style award for risks and public-spiritedness | City opposed; no class was certified and no legal basis for a representative fee | Denied: no legal authority or class-certification support; $702.96 damages affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118 (U.S. 2007) (declaratory-judgment claim requires an actual controversy—threat of enforcement must be imminent)
- Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 322 (Ohio 2010) (a justiciable matter requires adverse legal interests; more than disagreement)
- Oberlin (Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Oberlin), 72 N.E.3d 676 (9th Dist. 2017) (repeal of an ordinance can moot injunctive/declaratory claims; plaintiff may still pursue fees; causation inquiry required)
- Phoenix Lighting Group, LLC v. Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC, 160 Ohio St.3d 32 (Ohio 2020) (lodestar: reasonable hours × reasonable hourly rate; benchmark rates to local market and complexity)
- Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143 (Ohio 1991) (adopts lodestar method in Ohio)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1983) (hours that are excessive, redundant, or unnecessary should be excluded when computing fees)
- Waldman v. Pitcher, 70 N.E.3d 1025 (1st Dist. 2016) (Ohio constitutional limit on subject-matter jurisdiction to justiciable matters)
