Keith Wicks v. United States, 226 A.3d 743

On June 14, 2016, Officer Nathan Clarke (a Metropolitan Police officer working part‑time for the Washington Nationals) observed Keith Wicks selling tickets near the center‑field gate and delivered a one‑page barring notice listing the Nationals’ address.
The barring notice warned Wicks to stay off Nationals’ "property and grounds" at 1500 S. Capitol St. SE; Wicks refused to sign and later denied receiving the notice.
On July 1, 2016, Clarke saw Wicks on the north/south side sidewalk along N Street SE (pedestrian‑only during games), recorded him walking by the will‑call office and selling tickets, and arrested him for unlawful entry.
At trial Clarke testified the sidewalk next to the stadium was Nationals property but admitted he had seen no official survey or reliable documentation and could only vaguely recall having seen unspecified online diagrams.
Wicks testified he believed that sidewalk was public; the trial court credited Clarke and convicted Wicks of unlawful entry.
The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, finding the government failed to prove (1) the sidewalk was private property and (2) Wicks knew or should have known his presence was against the Nationals’ will.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the sidewalk where Wicks walked private property of the Nationals?	Clarke’s testimony and the barring notice established Nationals’ ownership of the sidewalk.	Clarke had no official survey or reliable foundation; sidewalk generally is public and evidence was speculative.	Reversed — insufficient evidence; witness lacked personal, documented foundation to prove the sidewalk was private.
Did Wicks know or should he have known his entry was against the owner’s will (mens rea)?	Barring notice and prior contact put Wicks on notice that he was barred from Nationals property.	Notice was vague (gave a different street address), no signage/barriers, no map, and the prior contact was location‑specific and did not identify the will‑call sidewalk.	Reversed — mens rea not proved; government did not show Wicks knew or should have known he was on privately owned, off‑limits property.

Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 303 (D.C. 2013) (defines unlawful‑entry elements including entry onto private property and knowledge that entry was unwanted)
Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314 (D.C. 2017) (endorses Model Penal Code approach to mens rea and requires proof a defendant knows facts making conduct criminal)
Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C. 2001) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence in criminal prosecutions)
Joiner‑Die v. United States, 899 A.2d 762 (D.C. 2006) (witness competency limited to matters of personal knowledge)
Chvala v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 306 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (general principle that sidewalks are for public use)
Gittleson v. Robinson, 61 A.2d 635 (D.C. 1948) (historical rule on sidewalk extent from curb to building line)
Grayton v. United States, 50 A.3d 497 (D.C. 2012) (verdict cannot rest on speculative inferences)