3 F.4th 332
7th Cir.2021Background:
- In Sept. 2013 Chicago officers arrested Keith Smith after allegedly fabricating a furtive-movement/bullet story; he was jailed ~7 months.
- Smith was released on bond “on or about” March 29, 2014; bond required monthly court appearances and prior permission to leave Illinois.
- He was acquitted on July 21, 2016, and filed this § 1983 suit (Fourth Amendment unlawful pretrial detention; Monell claim) on July 18, 2018.
- The district court dismissed as time-barred, concluding the two-year limitations period began at Smith’s release on bond.
- Smith argued (1) accrual should be at his acquittal (relying on McDonough) or (2) bond conditions constituted a continuing Fourth Amendment seizure that delayed accrual.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding accrual occurred at release on bond and that standard bond conditions here were not a seizure; Monell/conspiracy claims fell with the Fourth Amendment claim.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did Smith’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful pretrial-detention claim accrue? | Accrued at favorable termination (acquittal on 7/21/2016); McDonough supports favorable-termination accrual for fabricated-evidence claims. | Accrued when custody ended (release on bond, 3/29/2014) consistent with Manuel II; suit filed 7/18/2018 was untimely. | Accrual occurs when detention ends; Manuel II remains good law after McDonough. Claim accrued at release on bond (3/29/2014) and is time‑barred. |
| Did Smith’s bond conditions (monthly appearances; travel-approval) constitute an ongoing Fourth Amendment seizure? | Bond conditions were sufficiently onerous to be a continuing seizure, so accrual was delayed until acquittal. | Standard bond conditions are future obligations/precursors to possible seizure and do not amount to an immediate or continuous Fourth Amendment seizure. | Standard bond conditions like attendance and permission-to-travel do not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure (no continuous seizure); Smith was not seized while on bond. |
| Were municipal (Monell) and conspiracy claims viable despite timeliness issues? | Monell claim should proceed; policy/city practice caused detention. | Monell/conspiracy claims rise or fall with timely Fourth Amendment claim. | Monell and conspiracy claims dismissed as they are intertwined with the (untimely) Fourth Amendment claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (Fourth Amendment governs pretrial detention challenges; accrual question remanded)
- Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2018) (Manuel II) (Fourth Amendment pretrial-detention claims accrue when plaintiff is released from custody)
- McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019) (fabricated-evidence due-process claims accrue at favorable termination; Heck considerations discussed)
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (false-arrest/false-imprisonment accrual tied to start of legal process; Heck bar limited to existing convictions)
- Bielanski v. City of Kane, 550 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (routine conditions to appear and seek travel permission do not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure)
- Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021) (defining seizure via physical force or show of authority; no continuing-seizure concept for force without submission)
- Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing due-process fabrication claims from Fourth Amendment claims)