Keith Redburn v. Charmelle Garrett
898 F.3d 486
5th Cir.2018Background
- City of Victoria operated a storm-sewer system historically culminating in an open ditch (Phillips Ditch) crossing land now owned by Redburn; the ditch carried runoff from a ~122-acre city drainage field across the property.
- Braman, Redburn’s predecessor, transferred a 0.11-acre strip to the City in 1939 and, in 1941, requested permission to build a fence over the ditch, stating he would “assume risk” of damage; the City granted the request.
- By 1932 the City had largely placed its sewer system underground elsewhere but left the open ditch across Braman/Redburn’s land; culverts exist at the parcel edges.
- Redburn purchased the property in 2004, complained to the City beginning in 2006 about erosion, debris, and safety hazards; he plugged a drain in 2011 and sued, asserting state-law claims and a federal takings claim under § 1983.
- The federal district court granted summary judgment for the City, holding the City had an easement by estoppel (and alternatively an implied easement) and no duty to accommodate Redburn; the Fifth Circuit vacated on easement issues and affirmed dismissal of the federal takings claim as time‑barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether City holds an easement by estoppel to drain across Redburn’s land | Braman’s 1941 letter did not create or concede a drainage right; Redburn relied on ambiguity and lack of City detrimental reliance | City: Braman’s letter and City’s permission to fence constituted representations and City relied to its detriment | Reversed: genuine factual disputes exist; City failed to show no dispute of material fact on estoppel |
| Whether City has an implied easement (prior use or necessity) | Redburn: quitclaim and historical facts do not show grant of a broad drainage easement; evidence suggests deed served street completion, not drainage | City: prior use/quitclaim established an implied easement to use ditch for drainage | Reversed: factual disputes on prior use; necessity inapplicable; City did not meet summary judgment burden |
| Whether, if an easement exists, the City must accommodate surface uses by burying pipes (reasonable‑use limitation on easement) | Redburn: City’s surface drainage unreasonably burdens servient estate; state law requires easement use be as little burdensome as possible and may require less destructive alternative (burying pipes) | City: no duty to accommodate; district court rejected applying the accommodation doctrine to easements | Vacated/reversed on this point for trial: if an easement exists, court must assess under Texas ‘‘reasonable use’’ principles whether City’s use is unreasonably burdensome and whether alternatives are required |
| Whether City’s ongoing drainage use constitutes a federal physical taking under the Fifth Amendment | Redburn: continuous erosion and inundation constitute a physical taking entitling him to compensation | City: claim is time‑barred; also contends use is within easement scope | Affirmed dismissal: § 1983 takings claim time‑barred (accrued by 2006; two‑year limitations) |
Key Cases Cited
- Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1962) (elements for easement by prior use)
- Hamrick v. Ward, 446 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. 2014) (distinguishes necessity and prior‑use implied easements)
- Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012) (scope of property rights and limits on burdens from dominant estate)
- Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971) (reasonableness requirement and alternatives in surface/subsurface conflicts)
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (permanent physical occupation is a taking)
- Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (superinduced additions of water/earth may effect a taking)
- United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (continuous flooding by government may be a taking)
- Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (§ 1983 claims borrow state statute of limitations)
- Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1995) (accrual rule for § 1983 claims)
