Keith Hoglund v. Ron Neal, 959 F.3d 819

Background

Defendant Keith Hoglund was convicted (2010 jury) of repeatedly molesting his daughter A.H.; sentenced to 50 years. A.H. gave graphic, consistent testimony of oral sex beginning at age ~4–5 until about age 7.
Three experts (pediatrician Dr. Butler, counselor Shestak, psychologist Dr. Mayle) testified about statements A.H. made to them; they also gave opinions tending to vouch for her credibility.
Defense counsel lodged some hearsay objections and some objections to vouching but did not consistently challenge admissibility under Indiana Rule 803(4) (medical-diagnosis exception) or the foundation that the child understood the diagnostic purpose.
On direct appeal the Indiana Supreme Court overruled Lawrence v. State (ending permissible indirect vouching) but held the vouching error harmless; the post-conviction court found counsel deficient for some failures but held any errors harmless under Strickland.
Hoglund sought federal habeas relief raising (1) ineffective assistance for failing to object to hearsay/foundation for 803(4) and (2) due-process violation from expert vouching; the district court denied relief and certified appealability on the two issues (and procedural-default question).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance — counsel failed to object to experts’ hearsay under medical exception (803(4))	Counsel performed deficiently by not challenging foundation that A.H. understood visits were for diagnosis/treatment; this prejudiced outcome.	Even if deficient, the errors were harmless: A.H.’s compelling, consistent testimony plus Hoglund’s incriminating statements and other evidence show no reasonable probability of a different result.	State post-conviction court found deficiency but no prejudice; federal court affirmed—AEDPA deference and, even de novo, no Strickland prejudice.
Due process — admission of experts’ vouching testimony	Vouching (direct and indirect) improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility and deprived Hoglund of a fundamentally fair trial.	At trial Lawrence permitted limited indirect vouching; after Lawrence was overruled, the error was harmless because A.H.’s testimony was strong and vouching was cumulative.	Not procedurally defaulted; federal court held the vouching errors did not create a significant likelihood an innocent person was convicted and affirmed denial of habeas relief.
Procedural default of due-process vouching claim	State filings focused on evidentiary rules, not federal constitutional law, so claim should be barred.	Fair presentment was sufficient; state courts understood the federal implications.	Federal court found the vouching claim was not procedurally defaulted and reached the merits.
Standard of prejudice / AEDPA deference	State courts applied too stringent a harmless-error standard (arguably not Strickland’s reasonable-probability test).	State courts applied Strickland and harmless-error concepts reasonably; regardless, de novo review finds no reasonable probability of a different outcome.	Federal court declined to find an unreasonable application of federal law; even on independent review, no Strickland prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance + reasonable-probability prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference: state-court decisions must be unreasonable, not merely incorrect)
Howard v. O'Sullivan, 185 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 1999) (due-process test for prejudicial evidentiary error: significant likelihood an innocent person was convicted)
Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923 (Ind. 1984) (former Indiana rule permitting limited indirect expert vouching)
Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2012) (Indiana Supreme Court overruling Lawrence but holding the vouching admission harmless)
Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2016) (prosecutorial vouching can be presumptively prejudicial when the case is not otherwise strong)