Keith D. Jackson v. State of Indiana
2012 Ind. App. LEXIS 263
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Keith D. Jackson appeals his sentence for possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and the revocation of his probation in a related cause.
- Jackson’s plea agreement in Cause No. 063 provided a twelve-year term with six years suspended in that cause and two years served in Cause No. 196, with discharge from probation in Cause No. 196.
- The trial court allocated credit time across causes and ordered 50 hours of community service and $500 in public defender fees as probation conditions.
- There was a credit-time dispute: the court later discharged Jackson in Cause No. 196 but awarded substantial credit in Cause No. 063.
- The court eventually revoked probation in Cause No. 196, ordering four years to be served with no credit, and ordered separate credit calculations for Cause No. 063.
- On appeal, the court held that (1) community service was not permitted under the plea, (2) the $500 public defender fee was improperly imposed, and (3) the suspended sentence should not have been served as a result of probation violation; the matter was reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether community service was an authorized probation condition | Jackson argues community service is punitive and not within the plea. | Jackson contends the court invited the error by agreeing verbally to community service. | Abuse; not permitted absent plea term. |
| Whether imposing public defender fees was proper | State argues fees may be imposed within statutory limits; plea did not specify. | Jackson asserts indigence and lack of statutory basis for $500 fee. | Abuse; remand to observe statutory requirements. |
| Whether the suspended sentence properly followed the probation violation handling | State contends plea called for re-sentencing as executed time in Cause No. 063 and probation discharge in Cause No. 196. | Jackson asserts plea required two-year sentence, not four, and that discharge should follow the agreed terms. | Abuse; remand to re-sentence consistent with the plea. |
Key Cases Cited
- Freije v. State, 709 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. 1999) (probation conditions must align with plea terms; punitive obligations require clear authorization)
- S.S. v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (plea agreement binds trial court to its terms; discretion limited after acceptance)
- Bennett v. State, 802 N.E.2d 919 (Ind. 2004) (plea agreement is contractual and binds court to sentencing provisions)
- Briscoe v. State, 783 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (court cannot add punitive obligations without explicit plea authorization)
- May v. State, 810 N.E.2d 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (statutory basis and indigency procedures required when imposing public defender fees)
- Lamonte v. State, 839 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (appointment of counsel creates only a presumption of indigency for fees)
- McRoy v. State, 794 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (indigency and ability-to-pay considerations govern fee imposition)
- Berry v. State, 950 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (courts may suspend payment until after sentence when determining indigency)