Keith D. Abney v. State of Indiana
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 268
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Police executed a warrant at Keith D. Abney’s residence in October 2015 and found heroin, meth paraphernalia, a .380 handgun, surveillance equipment, and cash; Abney and others were present. Abney was charged with multiple drug and related felonies; charges were later amended.
- Abney requested a public defender; trial occurred June 27–28, 2016; jury found Abney guilty on the charged counts.
- On June 23, 2016 (shortly before trial), Abney moved to recuse Judge William C. Menges, Jr., based on a newspaper article reporting that the elected county prosecutor and other local attorneys had been listed on Judge Menges’s re-election campaign materials or advisory committee.
- At a hearing the judge denied recusal, noting (1) the prosecutor had not actively participated in campaign activity, (2) the Judicial Qualifications Commission saw no disqualifying issue, and (3) both sides’ senior public defenders had also publicly endorsed the judge.
- Abney also contended the court improperly excluded certain testimony (hearsay from police affidavits about third‑party dealers) and later challenged the sentencing credit calculation as a scrivener’s error.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: (1) denial of recusal, finding Criminal Rule 12 requirements not met and no reasonable inference of bias under the Code of Judicial Conduct; (2) no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence (hearsay/waiver); and (3) sentencing credit was correct once good‑time credit was applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judge should have recused for alleged campaign ties | Abney: prosecutor’s name on judge’s re‑election materials and contemporaneous article required disclosure and recusal under Kiang analogy | State/Judge: prosecutor had not actively participated; judge disclosed facts and JQC found no disqualification; Criminal Rule 12 technical requirements not followed | Denial affirmed — Abney failed to comply with Crim. R. 12 timing/affidavit requirements; objective review shows no rational inference of bias |
| Whether Code of Judicial Conduct independently supplies relief | Abney: Code required recusal regardless of Rule 12 | State: Code is enforced by judge/self and ultimately Supreme Court; litigant cannot bypass Rule 12 | Court rejects independent Code‑based remedy; even on independent review, no disqualification under the Code |
| Admissibility of testimony/affidavit facts about third‑party dealer (Acord) | Abney: excluded testimony/affidavit showing Acord was the actual dealer deprived jury of reasonable‑doubt evidence and confrontation | State: objections properly sustained as hearsay; defendant waived some arguments by failing to offer proof | No abuse of discretion — objections sustained as hearsay; defendant did not preserve or show erroneous exclusion affected substantial rights |
| Whether sentencing order contains scrivener’s error re: jail credit | Abney: sentencing entry shows inconsistent arithmetic (295 actual days vs. 393 or 590 credit days) | State: Count 1 (Class B) earns 1 day good‑time per 3 days; 295 actual + ~98 good‑time = 393 total; no day‑for‑day credit on level 3 felony | Affirmed — credit calculation correct after applying Class B good‑time credit rules |
Key Cases Cited
- Voss v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind. 2006) (Criminal Rule 12 standard: treat affidavit facts as true and decide whether they support a rational inference of bias)
- Sturgeon v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. 1999) (standard of review and legal determination required on change‑of‑judge motions)
- Allen v. State, 737 N.E.2d 741 (Ind. 2000) (clarifies that change‑of‑judge entitlement depends on objective inference of bias, not subjective proof)
- Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (appearance of bias required recusal where opposing counsel served as chair of judge’s campaign committee)
- Mathews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (Code of Judicial Conduct does not create an independent mechanism for litigant relief from alleged judicial conflicts)