Keith Crabbs v. Zach Scott, 786 F.3d 426

Keith Crabbs turned himself in December 2010 on a first-degree felony voluntary-manslaughter charge and was released on bond.
Crabbs’ trial began in March 2012; the court revoked his bond after he arrived late and quarrelled with a witness, and he was rearrested and taken to jail for processing.
An amended DNA-collection statute required DNA from felony arrestees, but Crabbs’ DNA swab was not obtained during intake, triggering an ID hold delaying release.
After Crabbs was acquitted, officers refused to release him until he submitted to a cheek swab, prompting a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against Sheriff Scott in his official capacity.
The district court denied summary judgment; Scott appealed under the collateral-order doctrine, arguing sovereign immunity bars the claim because he acted as a state officer.
The court analyzes whether the sheriff acted as a state or county official under six factors and concludes he acted as a county official in this case, thus not barred by state sovereign immunity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether sovereign immunity bars the §1983 claim against the sheriff	Crabbs asserts the sheriff, acting under state authority, is immune.	Scott argues he acted as a state officer under Ohio law and is immune.	No; the sheriff acted as a county official, so sovereign immunity does not bar the claim.
Whether § 2901.07(B)(1)(a) required DNA collection in Crabbs’ case	Statute compelled DNA collection for arrestees during intake in all felonies.	Statute could apply to arrestees and dictates DNA collection timelines for intake.	No; the arrest after acquittal was not for a felony, and collection during intake was not mandated here.
Whether the sheriff’s DNA policy was mandated by state law or discretionary under state vs. county authority	Policies mechanically enforce state law, making him an arm of the State.	Policies reflect county discretion and do not render him a state actor.	No; the sheriff had discretion, not a mandatory state directive; not an arm of the State in this context.

McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781 (1997) (determines when officials act as state or county for immunity purposes)
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (official immunity depends on degree of discretion and whether actions follow state mandates)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a causal link to policy or custom)
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (causal link between municipal policy and deprivation of rights)
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (tests for official-capacity suits and state vs. local liability)
Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005) (factors for determining when a sheriff is a state or county official)
Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2002) (sovereign immunity and agency principles in health planning context)
In re Mason, 688 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (conditions of pretrial release and related arrest considerations)