Keith Bland v. Marcus Hardy, 672 F.3d 445

Keith Bland was convicted in state court of murder and armed robbery; he later challenged the conviction in federal habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The key factual dispute centers on the prosecutor’s use of Bland’s testimony about a January arrest and gun confiscation, allegedly false, to imply motive.
Bland’s counsel argued the prosecutor violated Napue and Giglio by exploiting a known false detail in closing arguments.
Bland contended the prosecutor violated Doyle v. Ohio by commenting on Bland’s silence or diminished responsiveness during police interrogation.
Bland also challenged the court’s requirement that he wear a stun belt during trial under Deck v. Missouri.
The district court and Seventh Circuit applied deferential review under § 2254(d), ultimately denying relief and affirming.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Napue/Giglio violation by exploiting false testimony	Bland because prosecutor knew false date used as motive.	Hardy because the state court found no prejudice and Napue not violated.	No constitutional violation; state court reasonably applied Napue/Giglio standards.
Doyle/Anderson inference from delay or silence	Bland argues prosecutor exploited silence to infer falsehood.	State argues Doyle/Anderson permit inference when suspect stops talking after initial statements.	No due process violation; decision not contrary to clearly established law.
Stun belt admissibility under Deck	Bland contends improper restraint without justified showing of danger.	State argues justified security; counsel failed to pursue a hearing.	No ineffective-assistance or prejudice; no clear error under Strickland.
Procedural default and exhaustion	Bland preserved claims through various state-court avenues.	Illinois procedural requirements not satisfied; default may bar relief.	§2254(b)(2) precludes relief on these merits; procedural default not decided, merits control.
Overall effectiveness of counsel re stun belt	Counsel ineffective for not objecting to stun belt or seeking hearing.	Record shows trial defense was vigorous; no deficient performance established.	No Strickland prejudice; performance not objectively deficient.

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor may not knowingly present false testimony)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (improper use of impeachment evidence or false testimony)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (silence after Miranda warnings cannot be used to prove guilt)
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (silence can illuminate previous statements for inference)
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (appearance and restraints must be justified by security necessity)
Stephenson v. Wilson, 619 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2010) (particularized showing of dangerousness required for stun belts)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (exhaustion of state remedies required for federal review)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (review on the record developed in state court; no new evidentiary hearings)
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008) (clear establishment of federal law standard for § 2254(d))
Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (due process considerations in evaluating state-court decisions)
Williams v. Lemmon, 557 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2009) (high deference to trial strategy; prejudice required for ineffective assistance)