Keenon Lamar Rhodes v. State of Florida
219 So. 3d 251
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Appellant Keenon Lamar Rhodes was convicted of two counts of burglary while armed with a firearm, possession of a controlled substance without a prescription, and resisting an officer without violence.
- Rhodes, during a custodial police interrogation, stated: “I’m not no lawyer. I need to see a lawyer.”
- An officer ignored that statement and continued questioning; Rhodes made inculpatory statements later in the interview.
- Rhodes moved to suppress statements made after his request to see a lawyer; the trial court denied the motion.
- The appellate majority reversed, holding Rhodes’s statement was a clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel and ordering suppression of all post-invocation statements.
- A dissent argued Rhodes’s comment was at most equivocal, invoking controlling Florida precedent permitting continued questioning unless the request is unequivocal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rhodes invoked his Miranda right to counsel | Rhodes: “I need to see a lawyer” is a clear, unequivocal request for counsel requiring cessation of questioning | State: In context the remark was equivocal and did not clearly invoke the right to counsel | Majority: Rhodes’s statement was a clear, unequivocal request; questioning should have stopped |
| Whether statements made after invocation must be suppressed | Rhodes: All post-invocation statements are inadmissible | State: Statements admissible because invocation was ambiguous | Majority: Suppress all portions of the recorded interview after invocation |
| Applicable standard for invocation of counsel | Rhodes: Invocation requires only a statement reasonably construed as requesting counsel | State: Invocation must be unequivocal; context can render it equivocal per controlling precedent | Majority: Applies clear-and-unequivocal standard; finds statement meets it |
| Precedential conflict between districts/supreme court decisions | Rhodes: Relies on district decisions finding similar language unequivocal | State: Relies on Florida Supreme Court authority (Jones/Owen) limiting invocation to unequivocal requests | Majority: Follows district authority here and reverses; dissent contends Jones controls and would affirm |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (establishes Miranda right to counsel and warnings)
- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1991) (invocation requires a statement that can reasonably be construed as a desire for counsel)
- Jones v. State, 748 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 1999) (an equivocal statement regarding counsel does not require cessation of questioning)
- State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1997) (clarifies that invocation must be clear and unambiguous)
- Moss v. State, 60 So.3d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (holds statements like “I want a lawyer” are unequivocal and require suppression)