Keenan Wilkins v. County of Alameda, 571 F. App'x 621

Plaintiff Keenan Wilkins, a pretrial detainee who had a prior felony conviction (1999), sued Alameda County and jail officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related statutes, alleging he was prevented from voting in 2008–2010 elections.
Wilkins claimed violations of the fundamental right to vote, equal protection, procedural due process, and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 for conspiracy and failure to prevent conspiracy.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims; Wilkins appealed pro se to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit concluded Wilkins’s asserted right to vote was a state statutory benefit (re-enfranchisement after completing sentence/parole) and therefore not actionable under § 1983 as a deprivation of a federal constitutional right.
The court found reversible error as to Wilkins’s equal protection, procedural due process, § 1985(3), and § 1986 claims because the district court (1) effectively entered summary judgment sua sponte on the equal protection “treated-differently” theory without proper notice and briefing, and (2) failed to provide adequate Rand notice about summary-judgment consequences to a pro se litigant.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of appointed counsel and affirmed summary judgment as to the substantive right-to-vote claim; it reversed and remanded the other claims for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denial of ballots violated a federal right to vote actionable under § 1983	Wilkins: denial of ballots infringed his fundamental right to vote	Defendants: California law could disenfranchise felons; re-enfranchisement is a state statutory benefit, not a federal right	Court: Affirmed for defendants—Wilkins’s claim concerns a state statutory benefit, not a § 1983 federal right
Whether unequal treatment (others received ballots) violated Equal Protection	Wilkins: he was treated differently than at least one inmate who got a ballot	Defendants: argued summary judgment on all claims (no specific equal protection argument in moving papers)	Court: Reversed—district court errored by granting summary judgment sua sponte without notice; remanded
Whether summary judgment process complied with Rand notice for pro se litigant	Wilkins: lacked adequate notice and opportunity to respond under Rule 56 / Rand	Defendants: provided general notice and moved on all claims (insufficiently specific)	Court: Reversed—Rand notice was untimely and nonconforming; inadequacy was not harmless; remanded
Validity of procedural due process, § 1985(3), and § 1986 claims	Wilkins: deprivation and conspiracy claims depend on the same inadequate notice and disputed facts	Defendants: moved for summary judgment generally; did not adequately address these claims	Court: Reversed—summary judgment on these claims vacated due to inadequate Rand notice; remanded

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007) (§ 1983 requires deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory right)
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (states may disenfranchise felons under the Equal Protection Clause)
Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2010) (re-enfranchisement of felons is a state statutory benefit, not a fundamental right)
Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1993) (courts should not grant summary judgment sua sponte without notice)
Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (procedural protections for pro se prisoners at summary judgment)
Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (requirements for notice to pro se litigants when the opponent moves for summary judgment)
Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012) (timeliness and adequacy of Rand notice)
Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1986) (standards for appointment of counsel in civil cases)
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (substantive due process framework for fundamental rights)