303 F. Supp. 3d 690
E.D. Ill.2018Background
- Janice Keen, a long‑time pharmaceutical sales rep, suffered multiple work‑related injuries (2010 onward), took repeated medical/FMLA leaves, and requested accommodations (modified territory, limited lifting, altered schedule).
- Teva (acquirer of Cephalon) reviewed title reclassifications and denied Keen promotion to Senior Executive Sales Specialist (SESS), citing lack of demonstrated leadership/mentorship despite meeting objective metrics.
- Keen returned to work intermittently (2013, 2014), had performance criticisms and reduced incentive pay tied to leave policies, and disputed allocation errors and administrative shortcomings.
- In 2015–2016 Keen again went on extended medical leave after surgeries; disputes arose over medical clearances, Work Care communications, disability/workers’ compensation benefits, company car/COBRA, and surveillance; Teva ultimately terminated her in April 2016.
- Keen filed numerous administrative charges (EEOC/IDHR/IWCC) and sued Teva asserting 37 counts: ADA/IHRA disability discrimination and failure to accommodate, Title VII/IHRA sex discrimination, retaliation (federal and state), IWA claims, and retaliatory discharge. Defendants moved for summary judgment; the court granted it in full and denied sanctions/strike motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intentional disability discrimination (including termination) | Keen says adverse actions (delayed returns, denial of promotion, bonuses, adverse reviews, removal of car, termination) were caused "but for" her disability | Teva contends actions were legitimate, nondiscriminatory business decisions: medical‑fitness concerns, neutral promotion criteria, leave/bonus/car/COBRA policies, and plaintiff was not a "qualified individual" due to prolonged inability to work | Court: Summary judgment for Teva; Plaintiff failed to show "but for" causation or pretext; at termination Keen was not a qualified individual because of indefinite/prolonged leave |
| Failure to accommodate (return 2013; territory modification) | Keen alleges Teva delayed/denied reasonable accommodations and refused territory modification required by her doctors | Teva argues it engaged in interactive process, required medical clarification, legitimately delayed pending surgery/clearance, and denied territory change after lack of clinical documentation/cooperation | Court: Summary judgment for Teva; record shows processes, requests for clarification, plaintiff impeded the interactive process and failed to present treating‑physician documentation supporting territory change |
| Gender discrimination (Title VII/IHRA) | Keen alleges men were promoted/treated more favorably and she was denied benefits/promotions because she is female | Teva says promotion denials were based on subjective leadership criteria and other contested benefits were discretionary or tied to neutral policies; comparators not similarly situated | Court: Summary judgment for Teva; plaintiff failed to identify adequate comparators or evidence of pretext linked to sex |
| Retaliation (federal statutes, IWA, and retaliatory discharge under Illinois law) | Keen contends adverse acts followed her EEOC/IDHR/IWCC complaints and thus were retaliatory | Teva maintains no causal link: actions driven by policies, legitimate reasons, and timing/communications do not show motivating retaliatory animus | Court: Summary judgment for Teva; plaintiff produced no direct evidence or a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence tying protected activity to adverse actions |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (jury credibility and summary judgment principles)
- Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 570 U.S. 338 (Title VII retaliation requires but‑for causation)
- Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476 (ADA does not guarantee leave entitlement; prolonged leave defeats "qualified individual" status)
- Monroe v. Indiana Dep't of Transp., 871 F.3d 495 (ADA causation/but‑for standard)
- Teruggi v. CIT Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654 (circumstantial evidence patterns for discrimination)
- Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (overall standard: whether evidence permits a reasonable factfinder to conclude protected characteristic caused adverse action)
- Ennin v. CNH Indus. Am., LLC, 878 F.3d 590 (pretext requires more than mistaken reasoning; must show lie)
- Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833 (failure‑to‑accommodate/interactive process principles)