12 F.4th 150
2d Cir.2021Background
- On Dec. 31, 2015 NYPD Det. Rudy Anzalone and Lt. John Ryan stopped near a parked sedan in Staten Island. Kee was standing on the sidewalk and admits he was "rolling dice" with a friend; he denies ever having been inside the sedan or smoking in it.
- Anzalone searched the sedan (unlocked, owner later identified as Tavares) and reported finding heroin, cocaine, and a lit marijuana cigarette; arrest paperwork and an RCDA intake sheet attributed observations to Anzalone and recorded that Kee had been in the car.
- Kee and the vehicle owner Tavares were arrested and charged with narcotics and marijuana offenses; Kee was arraigned Jan. 2, 2016 and detained briefly. On July 13, 2016 the state did not oppose Kee’s CPL § 30.30 speedy-trial motion and the case was dismissed.
- Kee sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and denial of the right to a fair trial (and other claims). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on those claims; Kee appealed.
- The Second Circuit: (1) affirmed summary judgment on the false-arrest claim (probable cause existed for loitering for gambling); (2) vacated summary judgment on malicious prosecution (favorable-termination and probable-cause issues) as to Det. Anzalone and the City; and (3) vacated summary judgment on the fair-trial claim (fabricated evidence) as to the individual defendants; remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| False arrest — probable cause | Kee: officers lacked probable cause to arrest for gambling; they did not observe gambling for money. | Defs: Kee admitted he was "rolling dice" and officers saw dice and $2,000 on Kee, giving probable cause to arrest for loitering for gambling (a violation). | Affirmed for defendants: probable cause existed for loitering for gambling based on Kee's admission and officers' observations, so false-arrest claim fails. |
| Malicious prosecution — favorable termination | Kee: speedy-trial dismissal under CPL §30.30 is a favorable termination for §1983 claims. | Defs: speedy-trial dismissal is neutral as to innocence and does not satisfy the §1983 favorable-termination requirement. | Reversed: speedy-trial dismissal generally qualifies as a favorable termination for §1983 malicious-prosecution claims (Murphy standard); defendants may rebut the presumption with a non-merits explanation. |
| Malicious prosecution — probable cause to prosecute | Kee: disputed facts (he denies being in the car; phone allegedly taken from his pocket; Tavares says car parked long before) undermine probable cause to prosecute for narcotics. | Defs: officers' account (saw Kee in car, found drugs and Kee's phone in car) provided probable cause to prosecute. | Reversed: genuine disputes of material fact about critical observations (e.g., whether Kee was in the moving car, origin of the phone) preclude summary judgment on probable cause; jury must resolve. |
| Fair-trial (fabricated evidence) | Kee: Anzalone fabricated/supplied false observations (saw Kee smoking in the car; phone recovered from car) to prosecutors; those statements were likely to influence a jury. | Defs: no trial occurred so fabricated evidence had no effect; documents are hearsay and insufficient at summary judgment. | Reversed: fabricated-evidence fair-trial claims are cognizable even without a trial (Frost, McDonough/Smalls frameworks); documents/party admissions and testimonial disputes create triable issues. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lucente v. County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary-judgment standard; construe facts for nonmoving party)
- Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (probable cause for any crime defeats false-arrest claim)
- Ashely v. City of New York, 992 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2021) (probable-cause principles for false arrest)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (probable cause requires only a probability of wrongdoing)
- Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938 (2d Cir. 1997) (speedy-trial dismissal generally favorable termination for malicious prosecution)
- Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2018) (federal §1983 claims use common-law favorable-termination standard despite state-law divergence)
- Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 980 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2020) (fair-trial claim cognizable even if no trial occurs)
- McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019) (accrual rule for fabricated-evidence fair-trial claims; favorable termination required to accrue)
- Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2016) (a fair-trial claim may be based on fabricated information conveyed to prosecutors)
- Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997) (fabricated evidence forwarded to prosecutors gives rise to §1983 claim)