Kearns v. Farmer Acquisition Company
157 So. 3d 458
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Kearns worked at Charlotte Honda and cross-trained into sales/finance; he objected to "power booking," a practice of listing nonexistent vehicle options and inflating buyer income on loan paperwork to obtain larger loans.
- He refused to complete at least one transaction he believed was fraudulent and reported concerns up the corporate chain, including to the parent corporation's general counsel (Jean Brown).
- Brown and a corporate comptroller met with Kearns, told him they would review files but declined his offer to show documented examples and asked him to keep the investigation quiet.
- The next day Kearns was terminated; testimony indicated the owner instructed the GM to fire him and labeled him a "troublemaker."
- Kearns sued under Florida's private-sector Whistleblower's Act (Fla. Stat. §§ 448.101–.105), alleging termination in retaliation for refusing to participate in violations of law (specifically Fla. Stat. § 817.03 for false statements to obtain credit).
- The trial court granted a directed verdict for the employer, finding Kearns failed to prove (1) an actual violation of law and (3) causation; the Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 448.102(3) requires proof of an actual violation of law or only a good-faith, objectively reasonable belief | Kearns: His testimony and the described scheme (power booking, income inflation) evidenced an actual statutory violation—specifically Fla. Stat. § 817.03 | Charlotte Honda: The FWA requires proof of an actual violation; Kearns did not prove a statutory violation and cited inapplicable federal statutes | Court: Although acknowledging split authority, held plaintiff must prove an actual violation under § 448.102(3); nevertheless, Kearns presented sufficient evidence of a violation of § 817.03 to submit to a jury |
| Whether Kearns established causation between protected activity and termination | Kearns: Temporal proximity, communications with corporate counsel, and testimony that owner instructed immediate firing and called him a troublemaker support causal link | Charlotte Honda: Denied causal link and argued insufficient evidence tying complaint to firing | Court: Rejected directed verdict—viewing evidence in plaintiff's favor a reasonable jury could find causation; remanded for trial |
Key Cases Cited
- GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hoy, 136 So. 3d 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (directed-verdict standard and viewing evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Aery v. Wallace Lincoln-Mercury, LLC, 118 So. 3d 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (adopting good-faith objectively reasonable belief standard under FWA)
- White v. Purdue Pharma, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (construing § 448.102(3) to require actual violation of law and applying FWA text and Florida precedent)
- Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1994) (describing FWA’s purpose protecting employees who refuse to assist employers violating law)
- Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (Title VII standard that opposition requires good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that conduct was unlawful)