Kearns v. Cuomo, 981 F.3d 200

Background

Plaintiff Michael P. Kearns is the Erie County Clerk and a designated agent of the New York State DMV; county clerks in some counties (including Erie) issue driver’s licenses under state law.
New York’s Driver’s License Access and Privacy Act (the “Green Light Law”) authorizes issuance of “standard” (non–REAL ID) licenses without verifying immigration status, brands them “Not for Federal Purposes,” limits DMV retention/disclosure of applicant documents, and requires DMV to notify individuals when federal immigration authorities request records.
Kearns sued Governor Cuomo, Attorney General James, and DMV Commissioner Schroeder (official capacities), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and an injunction preventing his removal, arguing compliance with the Green Light Law would expose him to prosecution under the INA (notably 8 U.S.C. § 1324) and would conflict with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373/1644.
The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing, finding Kearns failed to plausibly allege a credible, imminent threat of criminal prosecution or of being required to perform the challenged duties in a way that would produce mens rea.
The Second Circuit affirmed: issuance of standard licenses is expressly permitted by the REAL ID framework; Kearns lacks authority and a realistic role in record maintenance, disclosure, subpoena response, or notification; §§1373/1644 impose no penalties; and Kearns failed to plead facts supporting knowledge or reckless disregard required for §1324 liability.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Standing to challenge licensing provisions (preemption / §1324)	Kearns: issuing standard licenses without verifying immigration status could expose him to criminal liability under INA §1324 (harboring).	Defs: REAL ID expressly permits noncompliant/standard licenses; clerks’ ministerial role and lack of interaction/knowledge make prosecution implausible.	No standing — no credible threat of §1324 prosecution; issuance of standard licenses is authorized and Kearns lacks mens rea and contact to be prosecuted.
2. Standing to challenge nondisclosure provisions (conflict with §§1373/1644 and §1324)	Kearns: nondisclosure could violate federal information-sharing statutes and could trigger §1324 prosecution if disclosure is withheld.	Defs: §§1373/1644 impose no penalties; clerks lack authority to respond to federal requests or maintain records as alleged; no plausible mens rea for §1324.	No standing — §§1373/1644 create no prosecutable threat; Kearns lacks role/authority and mens rea to be prosecuted under §1324.
3. Standing to challenge notification requirement	Kearns: he may be required to notify applicants when feds request records, exposing him to conflict/prosecution.	Defs: statute requires the DMV commissioner to notify; county clerks like Kearns are not authorized or responsible to send such notifications.	No standing — notification duty does not apply to Kearns; he disclaimed responsibility and alleged no plausible future request.
4. Threat of removal from office	Kearns: if he defies the Green Light Law he risks removal by the Governor.	Defs: threat of removal is speculative; no basis to treat the Governor’s refusal to give assurances as a certainly impending injury.	No standing — removal is not certainly impending; speculative threats do not satisfy Clapper standard.

Key Cases Cited

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standing requires concrete, particularized injury)
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (pre-enforcement standing requires injury that is not speculative; certainly impending standard for some prospective harms)
Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013) (pre-enforcement challenge for credible fear of prosecution)
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (pre-enforcement standing principles)
United States v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013) (definition of “harboring” under §1324 requires intent to facilitate unlawful presence and prevent detection)
United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 1999) (examples of harboring include providing material support or facilitating employment)
DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2012) (failure to verify immigration status does not alone amount to unlawful conduct)
Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2019) (standing where statute expressly proscribed the conduct the plaintiff sought to engage in)
Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019) (statutory term “person” presumptively excludes the sovereign for certain statutory applications)
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (long failure to enforce a statute informs standing analysis)