Keagan Farris v. John H McKaig III
324 Mich. App. 349
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2018Background
- In 2010 John H. McKaig III was appointed lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) in child-protective proceedings concerning the minor plaintiff; the parents’ rights were later terminated and then reinstated on appeal.
- After reinstatement, plaintiff (through his father/next friend James Farris) sued McKaig for legal malpractice based on conduct while McKaig served as the child’s LGAL.
- McKaig moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(6), which immunizes a “guardian ad litem” acting within scope.
- Farris argued the GTLA immunity covers GALs but not LGALs (statutorily distinguished in MCL 712A.13a); the trial court held LGALs are a subset of GALs and granted summary disposition.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation and governmental-immunity precedent, concluded LGALs fit the legal meaning and purpose of “guardian ad litem” in MCL 691.1407(6), and affirmed summary disposition because the alleged conduct occurred within the LGAL role.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "guardian ad litem" in MCL 691.1407(6) includes lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) | Farris: GTLA immunity covers GALs only; MCL 712A.13a separately defines GAL and LGAL so LGALs are excluded | McKaig: LGALs perform the same core function as GALs and are therefore covered by the GTLA immunity for guardians ad litem | Court: "guardian ad litem" as used in MCL 691.1407(6) broadly includes LGALs when acting within scope; immunity applies |
| Whether statutory definitions in MCL 712A.13a control interpretation of MCL 691.1407(6) | Farris: the Probate Code’s separate definitions show the Legislature intended to distinguish LGALs for other statutes, so GTLA should exclude them | McKaig: MCL 712A.13a expressly limits its definitions to certain sections and does not amend the GTLA; LGALs perform the same child-protective role as GALs | Court: Definitions in MCL 712A.13a are limited to specified provisions and do not govern the GTLA; cannot import those definitions into MCL 691.1407(6) |
| Whether post-enactment development (creation of LGALs) signals legislative intent to exclude LGALs from existing GAL immunity | Farris: Legislature’s failure to amend GTLA after 1998 LGAL creation implies exclusion (expression unius) | McKaig: LGALs were designed to serve the same protective function as GALs; no amendment was necessary if LGALs are a subgroup of GALs | Court: Legislature likely viewed LGALs as fitting within the broad term "guardian ad litem," so no express amendment was required; immunity intended to include LGALs |
| Whether immunity applies to alleged malpractice here | Farris: plaintiff’s malpractice claims arise from LGAL duties and should not be immunized | McKaig: the alleged acts were performed as LGAL within statutory authority, so immunity bars suit | Court: All pleaded allegations concern acts within LGAL role; immunity under MCL 691.1407(6) applies and summary disposition was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Innovation Ventures v. Liquid Mfg., 499 Mich 491 (statutory-interpretation/summary-disposition standards)
- Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., 463 Mich 143 (GTLA grant of immunity is broad; exceptions narrow)
- Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich 626 (legislative intent / statutory interpretation principles)
- In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 (statewide legal development cited in underlying family-law appeals)
- In re Farris, 497 Mich 959 (Michigan Supreme Court remand relevant to underlying parental-rights proceedings)
- Bullock v. Huster, 209 Mich App 551 (earlier GAL-immunity litigation prompting legislative amendment)
- Bullock v. Huster (On Remand), 218 Mich App 400 (post-amendment holding that GALs are immune when acting within scope)
- Kater v. Brausen, 241 Mich App 606 (recognizing subgroups of a defined class may be covered without express mention)