Kawaljeet Tagore v. USA
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22913
5th Cir.2013Background
- Tagore, an IRS revenue agent, began wearing a kirpan after Sikh initiation; she wore a kirpan with about a 3.5–9 inch blade historically but adopted a 3-inch blade during workplace negotiations.
- FPS determined a kirpan with a blade over 2.5 inches is a “dangerous weapon” under 18 U.S.C. § 930 and denied a waiver; IRS placed Tagore on interim telework and then required she stop wearing the kirpan in the federal building or be AWOL.
- Tagore refused to reduce the blade below 3 inches, was denied entry to the Leland federal building, was placed AWOL, and ultimately terminated; she exhausted administrative remedies and sued under Title VII and RFRA.
- At summary judgment the district court found for the government on both Title VII and RFRA claims; Tagore appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Title VII (IRS not required to violate federal weapons law; accommodations would impose more than de minimis hardship) but reversed and remanded the RFRA claim for further fact development regarding the government’s compelling interest and least-restrictive-means showing, in light of an FPS policy recognizing case-by-case exceptions for kirpans.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tagore sincerely believes her faith requires a kirpan blade >2.5" | Tagore: religious mandate and community practice require wearing a >2.5" kirpan; she wore it continuously and sacrificed employment for it | Government: deposition inconsistencies undermine sincerity | Genuine issue of fact exists as to sincerity; judicial inquiry must be limited and Tagore presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment |
| Whether IRS violated Title VII by failing to accommodate Tagore | Tagore: refusal to accommodate (e.g., allow kirpan, allow telework) was religious discrimination | Government: IRS cannot override federal weapons statute or FPS/DHS security decisions; proposed accommodations impose more than de minimis hardship | Affirmed for defendant: IRS not liable—accommodation would violate federal law or impose undue (more-than-de-minimis) hardship |
| Whether FPS enforcement of §930(a) substantially burdened Tagore’s religious exercise (RFRA) | Tagore: enforcement forced her to choose job or religious practice; RFRA strict scrutiny applies | Government: compelling interest in uniform, rigorous application of weapon ban; case-by-case exceptions would undermine security | Prima facie burden satisfied; government must prove compelling interest and least-restrictive means—district court’s record inadequate; remanded for factual development |
| Whether categorical enforcement of §930(a) is the least restrictive means under RFRA | Tagore: individualized exemptions or limited conditions (blade length, concealment, clearance) could accommodate without compromising security | Government: uniform application essential to maintain building security; individualized inquiries impractical | Reversed and remanded: new FPS policy recognizing exceptions undercuts government’s prior uniformity argument; court requires more specific evidence on why alternatives are infeasible |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (RFRA strict scrutiny requires individualized justification)
- Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (Title VII does not require accommodations imposing more than de minimis cost)
- Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir.) (sincerity inquiry limited; ‘‘judicial shyness’’ about religious adjudication)
- Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir.) (elements of Title VII religious discrimination prima facie case)
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (Free exercise principles and the burden of choice between job and religion)
- Spratt v. Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections, 482 F.3d 33 (1st Cir.) (government must explain why less restrictive alternatives are infeasible under strict scrutiny)