116 N.E.3d 525
Ind. Ct. App.2018Background
- Jaylan Murray, a 16-year-old with an open DCS file and a history of running away, signed in at Arlington High School at 1:07 p.m. on Feb. 3, 2016 and left later without signing out through an unmonitored exit; he was murdered that afternoon off school grounds.
- Marcus Murray (father) had previously notified school principal Stan Law about Jaylan’s runaway behavior; police/DCS missing-person notices were routinely routed to the school.
- Appellants (co-personal representatives of Jaylan’s estate) sued Indianapolis Public Schools and Arlington for wrongful death, alleging negligent supervision/monitoring during school hours.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing ITCA immunity for policy decisions and that Jaylan was contributorily negligent; the trial court granted summary judgment without a response from Appellants; Appellants sought to set aside judgment due to a counsel scheduling/filing error, which the trial court denied.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding genuine issues of material fact exist as to (1) whether the school breached its duty to supervise/monitor a known-runaway student and (2) whether contributory negligence barred recovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver for failing to respond to SJ | Appellants: failure to file a response resulted from counsel confusion; merits should be considered. | School: Appellants waived appellate arguments by not responding to the summary-judgment motion. | Court: No waiver — trial rule requires the court to decide on designated evidence even if unopposed; decline to find waiver. |
| ITCA immunity for policy/nonfeasance | Appellants: claim is ordinary negligence in supervision/monitoring of a known-runaway student, not a challenge to attendance policy. | School: Claim is effectively a failure to adopt/enforce attendance policy (policy-based immunity under ITCA). | Court: ITCA inapplicable here because claim targets duty to protect/supervise a student (operational safety), not adoption/enforcement of an attendance policy. |
| Duty/breach — supervision & monitoring | Appellants: school knew of Jaylan’s runaway status and should have taken measures (contact parent/DCS/police, prevent unsupervised roaming). | School: did not owe a duty beyond ordinary measures or could not foresee the specific harm. | Court: Genuine issue of material fact exists whether the school breached its duty of ordinary/reasonable care under the circumstances; improperly decided on summary judgment. |
| Contributory negligence as complete bar | School: Jaylan’s own risky conduct (alleged illegal activity) caused his death; contributory negligence bars recovery. | Appellants: evidence conflicting about Jaylan’s conduct after leaving school; not established as matter of law. | Court: Material factual disputes exist about Jaylan’s conduct and its causal role; contributory negligence inappropriate for summary judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 686 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 1997) (party opposing summary judgment need not present evidence until movant meets its burden)
- Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970 (Ind. 2001) (school duty to exercise reasonable care and supervision may extend beyond school grounds depending on circumstances)
- LaPorte Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Rosales, 963 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. 2012) (public school’s common-law duty is to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for students)
- Miller v. Griesel, 308 N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 1974) (heightened care owed to children because of their propensity to do unreasonable things)
- Mullin v. City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278 (Ind. 1994) (ITCA construed narrowly against immunity)