Katrina F. Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security
861 F.3d 1197
11th Cir.2017Background
- Attorney Richard Culbertson represented four Social Security claimants (Wood, Akarcay, Schuster, Westfall) and secured favorable district-court judgments remanding each case to the Commissioner.
- Each claimant received past-due benefits; the Commissioner withheld 25% for attorney fees and in some cases awarded §406(a) administrative fees; courts awarded EAJA fees in each case.
- Culbertson sought §406(b) fees from withheld past-due benefits, typically calculating his requests by subtracting EAJA awards (and in one case §406(a) award) from the 25% withheld.
- The district court: (a) reduced Wood’s §406(b) award to account for a prior §406(a) award; (b) denied or deferred §406(b) awards for Akarcay and Schuster pending §406(a) determinations; and (c) granted Westfall’s §406(b) request but barred further fee requests (including §406(a)).
- Culbertson appealed, arguing (1) Dawson was misapplied to cap aggregate §406 fees at 25% of past-due benefits, (2) EAJA fees should not count toward the 25% cap, and (3) the district court exceeded its authority in directing/limiting commissioner action.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and fee awards for abuse of discretion, and affirmed the district court on all issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether aggregate §406(a) + §406(b) fees are capped at 25% of past-due benefits | Culbertson: Dawson only limits amounts paid out of benefits, not the total fees that may be authorized under §406 | Commissioner/District Court: Dawson requires aggregate fees not exceed 25% of past-due benefits | Held: Dawson controls in this circuit; aggregate §406(a)+(b) fees are limited to 25% of past-due benefits |
| Whether EAJA awards must be included when measuring the 25% cap | Culbertson: EAJA is paid by government and not from past-due benefits, so it should not count toward the 25% cap | Commissioner/District Court: Under Jackson, counsel must "effectuate the refund"—EAJA offsets §406(b) so the combined economic effect must be measured | Held: EAJA must be accounted for to prevent double recovery; district court properly combined EAJA and §406(b) effects when applying the 25% limit |
| Whether the district court exceeded its authority by restricting Commissioner action (e.g., in Westfall) | Culbertson: Court impermissibly directed the Commissioner not to award §406(a) fees or otherwise limited agency authority | Commissioner: District court exceeded power if it attempted to direct Commissioner; but court's order simply barred counsel from further fee requests | Held: No abuse of discretion—court did not improperly direct the Commissioner and acted within its authority to control attorney practice before it |
| Whether the district court erred procedurally in deferring §406(b) awards until §406(a) determinations | Culbertson: Court should have awarded §406(b) as requested (netting EAJA) without waiting for §406(a) determinations | Commissioner/District Court: Court properly deferred to avoid aggregate awards exceeding 25% and to allow correct accounting | Held: Affirmed—deferral and conditional rulings were reasonable methods to comply with circuit precedent and prevent double recovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 601 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir.) (approving deduction of EAJA award from §406(b) request to effectuate EAJA savings provision)
- Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002) (explains interaction of fee-shifting, contingency fees, and EAJA-saving provision in Social Security cases)
- Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.) (holds combined §406(a) and §406(b) fee awards may not exceed 25% of past-due benefits)
- Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.) (standard: review of district court attorney-fee decisions for abuse of discretion)
- Bergen v. Commissioner of Social Security, 454 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir.) (federal courts have authority to control and discipline attorneys appearing before them)