Kathryn Davidson v. State of Indiana, 211 N.E.3d 914

Background

In April 2018 Kathryn Davidson was injured as a passenger in a semi-truck crash on I‑69 in Monroe County; driver Nicholson (an employee of J Trucking) was found negligent and Davidson became severely injured.
Davidson served a tort‑claim notice on the State/INDOT alleging defective planning/traffic control and lack of barrier at the bridge pier; the State denied the claim.
Davidson sued J Trucking in Lake County, obtained a bench judgment apportioning fault entirely to Nicholson/J Trucking, settled the insurer claim, and voluntarily dismissed the Lake County action.
Davidson then sued the State/INDOT and several contractors in Monroe County alleging they contributed to the same injuries (design/maintenance/barrier failures).
Monroe defendants moved to dismiss on claim‑splitting, collateral estoppel, and related grounds; the trial court dismissed with prejudice on issue preclusion/collateral estoppel; the court of appeals reversed; the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer.
The Supreme Court held claim preclusion did not apply (different parties), but defensive issue preclusion barred Davidson’s Monroe County claims because the earlier comparative‑fault judgment allocated all fault to J Trucking; the Court affirmed dismissal with prejudice and rejected due‑process and Rule 56 conversion arguments.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether claim preclusion bars the Monroe County suit	Davidson: prior Lake County judgment does not bar because different parties (State/contractors were not parties there)	Defendants: prior judgment should preclude later claims arising from same accident	Held: Claim preclusion does not apply because parties/privity differ
Whether issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) bars relitigation of causation/fault	Davidson: she didn’t "lose" in Lake County and had not litigated fault regarding the State/contractors	Defendants: Lake County judgment necessarily adjudicated all fault under the Comparative Fault Act, so Davidson is precluded from relitigating apportionment	Held: Issue preclusion applies — prior allocation of 100% fault to J Trucking precludes relitigation against subsequently sued tortfeasors
Whether the Comparative Fault Act can preclude subsequent claims against government defendants	Davidson: Act excludes "tort claims" against government, so the State/INDOT cannot be bound by a prior comparative‑fault allocation	Defendants: although Act excludes government tort claims, the Act requires the factfinder to consider fault of all persons; a judgment under the Act still allocates total fault and can preclude later suits	Held: Act applies to actions involving both private and government defendants for purposes of apportioning fault; prior apportionment precludes later claims against the government defendants for the same injury
Whether the trial court erred by not converting Rule 12 motions to Rule 56, by dismissing with prejudice, or by violating due process	Davidson: trial court considered extrinsic materials without considering her opposing evidence and should have converted to summary judgment; dismissal with prejudice denied amendment and due process	Defendants: court only judicially noticed filings (not extrinsic evidence) so no conversion; Rule 12(C) properly asserted collateral‑estoppel defense; dismissal with prejudice was permissible	Held: No error — court properly limited consideration to judicially noticed materials, did not have to convert to Rule 56, dismissal with prejudice was allowable, and no due‑process violation was shown

Key Cases Cited

Bornstein v. Watson’s of Indianapolis, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (a judgment under the Comparative Fault Act apportions 100% of fault and can bar later suits against omitted tortfeasors)
National Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 2012) (defensive collateral estoppel principles)
Sullivan v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 605 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. 1992) (non‑mutual issue preclusion framework)
State v. Snyder, 594 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 1992) (discussing mixed‑theory verdicts involving government and private defendants)
Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 2005) (nonparty defense and limiting liability by naming nonparties)
Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 2001) (procedures for naming nonparties to apportion fault)
Mendenhall v. Skinner and Broadbent Co., Inc., 728 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 2000) (comparative‑fault judgment allocates shares of total fault)