269 A.3d 435
N.J.2022Background
- Moynihan and Lynch had a long-term "marital-style" relationship; Lynch purchased and later put the Bordentown home in a trust and then on a joint deed naming Moynihan beneficiary/coowner.
- Between 2012–2014 Lynch drafted and the parties signed a handwritten, notarized prospective separation agreement: within five years after Lynch vacated the home he would pay off the mortgage, deed the home to Moynihan, pay her $100,000, and pay two years of property taxes.
- Neither party obtained attorney review before signing; after they split in 2015 Lynch refused to perform under the agreement.
- Trial court found the written document enforceable as a final contract (not a palimony agreement) and rejected a claim of an earlier oral palimony promise; Appellate Division held the writing was a palimony agreement and unenforceable for lack of the attorney-review required by N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h).
- The Supreme Court held the writing is a palimony agreement but struck down the statute’s attorney-review requirement under Article I, ¶ 1 of the New Jersey Constitution (substantive due process) and enforced the written agreement; it also affirmed that no enforceable oral palimony agreement existed pre-2010.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the written, notarized separation document is a palimony agreement subject to N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) | The writing should be enforced as a regular contract (or on equitable grounds); not subject to the attorney-review bar | The writing is a palimony agreement and unenforceable because neither party had independent counsel | Court: The instrument is a palimony agreement, but enforceable because the statute’s attorney-review requirement is unconstitutional |
| Whether N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s attorney-review requirement violates the Contract Clauses (U.S. & NJ) | It impairs contractual obligation and is invalid | The statute is prospective and does not retroactively impair contracts; it serves legitimate objectives | Court: No Contract Clause violation – statute did not retroactively impair an existing contract |
| Whether the attorney-review requirement violates substantive due process / personal autonomy (Art. I, ¶ 1, NJ Const.) | Compelling counsel to enter a private contract infringes autonomy and disproportionately burdens the poor; no comparable requirement exists for other private contracts | The requirement protects vulnerable parties and advances legitimate public purposes | Court: Attorney-review mandate is an arbitrary intrusion on autonomy and violates Article I, ¶ 1; struck down; writing must still meet standard Statute of Frauds requirements (writing and signature) |
| Whether an enforceable oral palimony agreement existed before the 2010 amendment | Moynihan contends there was an earlier oral promise of lifelong support | Lynch denies any enforceable oral promise; trial court found no such promise | Court: Affirmed trial court — sufficient evidence supports conclusion there was no pre-2010 oral palimony agreement |
Key Cases Cited
- Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565 (discusses the 2010 Statute of Frauds amendment adding palimony and its effects)
- Devaney v. L’Esperance, 195 N.J. 247 (recognition of palimony claims in marital-type relationships)
- In re Estate of Roccamonte, 174 N.J. 381 (palimony and promises of support under common law)
- Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378 (enforcement of oral agreements in intimate relationships)
- Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (articulating balancing test for liberty interests: nature of right, extent of restriction, public need)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (right of self-representation and individual autonomy in criminal proceedings)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (rationale for honoring pro se choice as autonomy)
- Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (Contract Clause analysis and reasonable expectations)
- Cleveland & P.R. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 235 U.S. 50 (principles on retrospective impairment of contracts)