Kathleen M. Grant v. John D. Grant
199 Wash. App. 119
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Kathleen and John Grant divorced in 2010 via a stipulated dissolution decree that incorporated a two-page asset distribution stating Kathleen would receive $178,000 and John would receive “the balance of the assets.”
- The decree and attached exhibits did not mention John’s Washington State PERS pension plan; John prepared the asset lists and drafted the distributions.
- Kathleen later claimed she did not know about the PERS account at the time of the dissolution and filed multiple motions for relief from the decree, all denied; she then brought a 2015 partition action seeking one-half of the PERS plan.
- The trial court granted John summary judgment dismissing the partition claim and awarded him attorney fees; Kathleen appealed.
- The appellate court considered whether an unmentioned community asset (the PERS pension) was effectively disposed of by the decree’s “balance of the assets” language or remained undivided and therefore owned as tenants in common.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Grant) | Defendant's Argument (Grant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2010 divorce decree disposed of John’s PERS pension | The decree’s award of “the balance of the assets” to John did not specifically identify or dispose of the PERS plan; therefore the pension was not allocated and remains community property subject to partition | The lump‑sum language awarding “the balance of the assets” to John (and the parties’ intent to split assets) should be read to include and thus divest Kathleen’s interest in the PERS account | The decree failed to identify or dispose of the PERS plan; undisposed community property vests in former spouses as tenants in common — Kathleen is entitled to a one‑half interest in the PERS plan as of the divorce date |
| Whether Kathleen’s knowledge of the PERS plan at the time of the decree affects allocation | Kathleen’s actual knowledge is irrelevant to the core rule that assets must be identified to be disposed of; the court must have sufficient notice to exercise its equitable authority | John argued Kathleen knew of the plan (via mail, discussions, pay stubs) and thus the omission should not defeat his claim | Court did not resolve knowledge disputes because the undisputed record showed the decree lacked specificity; held that identification, not proof of knowledge, is the controlling requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Yeats v. Estate of Yeats, 90 Wn.2d 201 (1978) (settlement agreements and decrees must identify assets with sufficient specificity to permit court review and disposition)
- Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wn.2d 503 (1965) (undistributed property not mentioned in decree remains subject to partition)
- In re Marriage of Buchanan, 150 Wn. App. 730 (2009) (pension not disposed of in decree remains property of former spouses as tenants in common)
- Barros v. Barros, 34 Wn. App. 266 (1983) (spousal pension not disposed of in decree is owned as tenant in common)
- Monaghan v. Monaghan, 78 Wn. App. 918 (1995) (undeclared accounts receivable remained community property and were subject to partition)
- Sears v. Rusden, 39 Wn.2d 412 (1951) (court cannot affect property rights not brought before it)
- Robinson v. Robinson, 37 Wn.2d 511 (1950) (older decision holding “all other property” language sufficient — distinguished in Yeats and not followed here)
Conclusion: The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s summary dismissal and fee award, and remanded with instructions to declare Kathleen a one‑half tenant in common in John’s PERS pension to the extent of its value at the time of dissolution.