Kathleen Benison v. George Ross, 765 F.3d 649

Background

Kathleen Benison, a tenured CMU geology professor, took a Spring 2012 sabbatical under a signed agreement to return for one academic year or refund salary and benefits. Her husband Christopher, a CMU undergraduate, sponsored a December 2011 no-confidence resolution against CMU’s president and provost.
While on sabbatical Kathleen applied for a promotional pay supplement; her department and dean gave negative, nonbinding recommendations but she resigned before the provost made a final determination.
After Kathleen resigned to accept a job elsewhere, CMU demanded repayment of sabbatical compensation; when she refused CMU sued in state court to recover salary and benefits (including tuition remission paid for Christopher) and placed a hold on Christopher’s transcript for the resulting balance.
The Benisons sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation (third-party and association claims), asserting the lawsuit and transcript hold were retaliatory for Christopher’s role in the no-confidence vote.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Sixth Circuit panel affirmed dismissal as to the individual-capacity claims but reversed as to President Ross in his official capacity, finding triable issues that CMU’s suit and the transcript hold could have been retaliatory and that qualified immunity did not bar the official-capacity claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether CMU’s filing of a state-court suit to recover sabbatical compensation was a First Amendment adverse action motivated by retaliation for Christopher’s protected speech	The suit (and related transcript hold) were taken in retaliation for Christopher’s sponsorship of the no-confidence resolution; CMU rarely sues faculty for similar breaches, and other circumstantial evidence shows retaliatory animus	CMU had a contractual right to recover compensation; other professors who didn’t return were treated differently for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons; temporal gap weakens causation	Triable issue: sufficient circumstantial evidence (comparators, communications) to create a genuine dispute of causation; summary judgment reversed as to official-capacity claim
Whether the transcript hold on Christopher is an adverse action and causally connected to protected activity	Transcript hold was an adverse action that interfered with Christopher’s education and flowed directly from CMU’s decision to recoup benefits	Transcript hold was a routine enforcement of outstanding tuition balance and not motivated by speech	Held adverse; its legality/causation rises or falls with the sabbatical-repayment claim; triable issue exists
Whether intermediate negative recommendations (department and dean) denying Kathleen’s promotional pay supplement constitute adverse actions	These negative recommendations were retaliatory and contributed to constructive discharge / denial of career advancement	Recommendations were nonbinding intermediate steps; Kathleen resigned before final administrative decision so no adverse final action	Not adverse: intermediate negative recommendations are not final adverse employment actions; summary judgment affirmed on this claim
Whether defendants (individuals) are entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged retaliation	Plaintiffs say actions violated clearly established First Amendment rights	Defendants assert qualified immunity (and that meritorious suits cannot constitute retaliation)	Qualified immunity unavailable against CMU in official-capacity suit; personal-capacity claims for those individuals were affirmed dismissed by the panel

Key Cases Cited

Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392 (6th Cir.) (standard of review for summary judgment in this circuit)
Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286 (6th Cir.) (First Amendment retaliation burden-shifting framework and evidence of retaliatory pattern)
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (third-party/associational retaliation standing)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (definition of adverse action that would chill ordinary firmness)
Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542 (6th Cir.) (intermediate academic recommendations are not final adverse actions)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (summary judgment must be decided drawing inferences for nonmoving party)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard: genuine dispute for jury)