916 F.3d 783
9th Cir.2019Background
- Washington reclassified publicly subsidized in-home childcare providers in 2006 as "partial" state employees for collective bargaining and allowed them to elect an exclusive bargaining representative.
- SEIU Local 925 was elected as the exclusive bargaining representative; providers may decline membership but SEIU must represent all unit members.
- Nonmembers were previously required to pay agency fees, but those fees were removed after Harris v. Quinn.
- Katherine Miller, a former SEIU member, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming Washington’s recognition of SEIU as exclusive representative violated her First Amendment rights of speech and expressive association.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the State and SEIU; Miller appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding exclusive representation does not violate Miller’s First Amendment rights and is justified by the State’s interest in labor peace.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state authorization of an exclusive bargaining representative for partial public employees violates the First Amendment right of expressive association | Miller: Exclusive representation compels association and lets a union speak for dissenting nonmembers, infringing associational rights | State/SEIU: Knight controls; exclusive representation is permissible and does not abridge free speech/association; Janus did not overrule Knight | Held: Exclusive representation is constitutionally permissible; Knight governs and, even under exacting scrutiny, labor peace justifies the minimal infringement |
| Whether Janus effectively overruled Knight so as to invalidate exclusive-representation schemes | Miller: Janus stated exclusive representation impinges associational freedom, so Knight is displaced | State/SEIU: Janus’s remarks on exclusive representation were dicta and did not overrule Knight; Janus preserved exclusive representation while striking agency fees | Held: Janus did not implicitly overrule Knight; Knight remains the controlling precedent |
| Standard of review and level of scrutiny for associational burden | Miller: The burden requires close scrutiny and may be substantial | Defendants: Any burden is minimal because providers are partial employees with limited union scope; exacting scrutiny applies but is satisfied | Held: Exacting scrutiny applied; the burden is minimal and the compelling interest of labor peace justifies exclusive representation |
| Availability of less-restrictive alternatives to exclusive representation | Miller: State could adopt a system that leaves providers "alone" or allows individualized negotiation | State/SEIU: No workable, significantly less-restrictive alternative proposed that preserves managerial efficiency and labor peace | Held: No adequate less-restrictive alternative identified; exclusive representation is justified |
Key Cases Cited
- Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) (upholding exclusive representative scheme and concluding nonmembers’ speech/associational rights were not infringed by exclusion from meet-and-confer)
- Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (overruled Abood as to agency fees; observed that states may require exclusive representation but cannot compel financial support)
- Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (recognized "labor peace" as justification for agency fees—later disapproved by Janus)
- Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (held states may not compel partial public employees to pay agency fees; emphasized limited scope of representation for partial employees)
- Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (directive to follow directly applicable Supreme Court precedent absent a clear overruling)
- Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018) (post-Janus circuit decision reaching same conclusion: exclusive representation of partial public employees is permissible)