KASSIN v. AR RESOURCES, INC.
3:16-cv-04171
D.N.J.Sep 28, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Rafael Kassin received a one-page debt-collection letter from AR Resources, Inc. seeking $3,756.55 for medical services and instructing the recipient to call ARR if insurance may cover the debt.
- The letter included the FDCPA-mandated 30-day validation notice in bold, stating disputes must be made in writing within 30 days for verification or judgment to be mailed.
- Kassin sued individually and as a putative class under the FDCPA, alleging the insurance-related telephone instruction contradicted and overshadowed the written-dispute validation notice (violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692g and § 1692e).
- The Court denied ARR’s earlier motion to dismiss, applying the “least sophisticated debtor” standard and concluding the call instruction could mislead a consumer into thinking a telephonic dispute sufficed.
- ARR moved for permission to file an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), arguing (1) the issue presents a controlling question of law, (2) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion in the district (citing Cruz v. Financial Recoveries), and (3) an immediate appeal would materially advance termination and justify a stay of discovery.
- The Court denied leave to appeal, finding no substantial ground for difference of opinion because differing district-court outcomes reflected factual application, not divergence on the governing legal standard (the least sophisticated debtor test).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ARR's instruction to call about insurance contradicted the FDCPA 30-day written-validation notice under the least sophisticated debtor standard | The telephone instruction could cause a debtor to mistakenly treat a telephonic inquiry as a timely dispute, undermining the written-only validation requirement | The insurance-language merely requested information and did not contradict the written-validation notice; other district decisions (e.g., Cruz) reached the same view | Court previously held the call instruction plausibly misleading under the least sophisticated debtor standard; on the interlocutory-motion, Court denied §1292(b) leave because no substantial ground for difference of opinion on the governing legal standard |
| Whether the interlocutory order involves a controlling question of law suitable for §1292(b) certification | N/A (Plaintiff did not dispute this) | The order involves a controlling legal question that could be dispositive and eliminate trial | Court agreed the question is controlling but proceeded to require substantial ground for difference of opinion |
| Whether there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion justifying interlocutory appeal | N/A | District-court decisions differ on application; Cruz and others show substantial disagreement | Court found no substantial ground: other decisions applied the same least-sophisticated-debtor standard and merely reached different factual outcomes; mere disagreement is insufficient |
| Whether an immediate appeal would materially advance termination of litigation | N/A | An interlocutory appeal could eliminate the need for trial and justify staying discovery | Court acknowledged an appeal might materially advance termination but denied certification due to failure of second §1292(b) prong |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopts the least sophisticated consumer standard for FDCPA misleading-practices analysis)
- Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991) (applies the least sophisticated debtor standard in FDCPA claims)
- Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974) (defining a "controlling question of law" for interlocutory appeals under §1292)
- Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976) (recognizes district court discretion and policy against piecemeal interlocutory appeals)