Karla Grimes v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C., 505 F. App'x 376

Grimes, a Wal-Mart Store Manager since 1986, declined a Market Manager promotion in 2008 due to her son’s needs, alleging Wal‑Mart knew of his disability and treated her more harshly after the decline.
In Jan 2009, Wal‑Mart investigated forged interview sheets; Grimes and Guebara were disciplined for “Gross Misconduct” but received step‑three discipline, with Grimes demoted to Assistant Manager.
Around Feb 2009, Grimes was terminated for pay‑code discrepancies uncovered in an audit; Guebara was also fired.
Grimes sued for sex discrimination, retaliation, associational discrimination, and defamation; the district court granted summary judgment for Wal‑Mart.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, applying McDonnell Douglas framework, sustaining Wal‑Mart’s nondiscriminatory reasons and rejecting Grimes’ pretext theories; the exclusion of an expert was deemed moot.
The opinion notes the question of associational discrimination is unsettled in the Fifth Circuit and cites related but non‑binding authority.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Prima facie discrimination established?	Grimes argues sex and associational claims shown.	Wal‑Mart argues Grimes cannot meet prima facie for sex or associational discrimination.	No, Grimes fails to establish a prima facie case for either claim.
Pretext evidence sufficient?	Grimes contends Wal‑Mart’s reasons are pretextual.	Wal‑Mart offers two incidents as legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.	Insufficient evidence of pretext; reasons are credible and not undermined by record.
Is there evidence of conflicted explanations?	Inconsistent termination reasons suggest pretext.	“Integrity issues” encompass both incidents; no inconsistency.	No inconsistency; explanations properly describe the underlying misconduct.
Contemporaneous evidence of violations undermines pretext?	Evidence of coding violations by Grimes undermines nondiscriminatory reasons.	Contemporaneous evidence supports liability grounds and Grimes’ supervisory responsibility.	Evidence supports Wal‑Mart’s nondiscriminatory reasons; not pretextual.
Expert testimony exclusion error?	Experts would support discrimination/pretext.	Exclusion upheld; not reversible given summary judgment affirmation.	Moot; affirmed.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for discrimination)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 F.3d 242 (U.S. 1986) (defines genuine dispute of material fact for summary judgment)
Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1993) (pretext requires evidence that proffered reason is unworthy of credence)
Ibarra v. United Parcel Serv., 695 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2012) (reiterates standard for reviewing summary judgment)
Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2011) (pretext, burden on plaintiff to show employer’s reason is pretextual)
Muñoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2000) (exclusion of expert testimony reviewed for abuse of discretion)